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International Law and the Limits of Macroeconomic Cooperation
Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes1
July 25, 2012
Abstract. The macroeconomic policies of states can produce significant costs and benefits for
other states, yet international macroeconomic cooperation has been one of the weakest
areas of international law. We ask why states have had such trouble cooperating over
macroeconomic issues, when they have been relatively successful at cooperation over other
economic matters such as international trade. We argue that although the theoretical
benefits of macroeconomic cooperation are real, in practice it is difficult to sustain because
optimal cooperative policies are often uncertain and time variant, making it exceedingly
difficult to craft clear rules for cooperation in many areas. It is also often difficult or
impossible to design credible self-enforcement mechanisms. Recent cooperation on bank
capital standards, the history of exchange rate cooperation, the European monetary union,
and the prospects for broader monetary and fiscal cooperation are all discussed. We contrast
the reasons for successful cooperation on international trade policy.

Introduction
Recent events highlight a range of issues raised by uncoordinated national
macroeconomic policies. The financial crisis of 2008 can be blamed in part on the
failure of the Basel agreements to prevent banks in different countries from taking
on excessive risk. The Basel agreements, which imposed uniform capital adequacy
regulations on banks in different countries, were thought necessary to prevent
national regulation from driving banks overseas, but countries failed to develop and
implement sufficiently strict international rules. Then in the midst of the financial
crisis, central banks attempted to coordinate their rescues and even interest rate
cuts. Because large banks conduct operations across borders, a central bank that
rescues one bank may end up helping depositors who live in foreign countries, but
central banks will be tempted to undersupply such a public good unless they can
cooperate with each other. Reports suggest that cooperation was at best ad hoc and
incomplete. Finally, the Eurozone crisis has demonstrated anew what happens when
governments fail to coordinate their macroeconomic policies. Here, the failure of
European governments and institutions to prevent Greece from borrowing too
much, and then their difficulty in coordinating a response to the sovereign debt
crisis in Greece and other periphery countries, helped cause and sustain the
financial crisis in Europe and plunged much of the continent into a deep recession.
Kirkland & Ellis Professor, University of Chicago Law School; James & Patricia Kowal Professor of
Law, Stanford Law School. We thank an audience at University College London for comments, and
Ellie Norton and Randall Zack for research assistance.
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These dramatic events from the last few years are only the latest
manifestations of the limits of international macroeconomic cooperation. Countries
have tried for decades to control fluctuations in exchange rates in the hope of
reducing exchange rate risk faced by firms and stimulating international trade.
While there have been some limited successes, countries have failed to find a lasting
solution. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the gold standard
limited currency fluctuations among major trading nations, but the countries left the
gold standard during the Great Depression.2 After World War II, western countries
established the Bretton Wood system to manage exchange rates, but that system
collapsed in 1973.3 Since then, episodic attempts at ad hoc cooperation to address
exchange rates have largely failed.4 Monetary union in Europe was the most
ambitious effort, but is now in disarray.
The failures and partial failures of international macroeconomic cooperation
can be contrasted with a major success in international law in a closely related field:
international trade. Leaders at the end of World War II saw cooperation over
exchange rates and cooperation over trade as parallel elements in a strategy of
rebuilding and integrating the west. In the case of trade, countries built the GATT
system and then developed it further into the WTO, a sophisticated institution for
coordinating trade policy and resolving disputes. Over several decades, the
members of GATT and the WTO successfully eliminated many major trade barriers,
including tariffs on goods. International trade boomed. Yet the Bretton Woods
system, which also featured a major international institution in the International
Monetary Fund, sputtered out in a few decades. And other forms of macroeconomic
cooperation never got off the ground outside Europe.
In this paper, we ask a simple question: why has international cooperation on
macroeconomic matters been so much less successful than cooperation on
international trade? The answer is not obvious. Lowering trade barriers, controlling
currency movements, regulating banks, and the like, are all aspects of modern
economic regulation, and there is no a priori reason why the first should be easier
than the others.

See Barry Eichengreen, GOLDEN FETTERS: THE GOLD STANDARD AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION, 1919-1939, 426 (1992) (explaining why the gold standard succeeded and its eventual abandonment).
3 See Paul R. Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld & Marc J. Melitz, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, 518, 526-27 (9th
ed. 2012) (outlining the rise and fall of the Bretton Wood system).
4 See, e.g., Frederic S. Mishkin, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING & FINANCIAL MARKETS, 542-43 (2d ed.
2010) (describing the European Monetary System).
2
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Our answer is based on the relationship between these goals and the nature
of the decentralized cooperation that prevails among states. First, there is a great
deal more academic consensus on the benefits of lowering trade barriers than on
the benefits of the other activities. Second, the lowering of trade barriers lends itself
to rule-based cooperation, while the other forms of cooperation cannot be easily
reduced to simple rules. Rule-based cooperation is easier to maintain than
cooperation that requires more fluid forms of behavior. Third, international trade
cooperation is more amenable to self-enforcement than cooperation on
macroeconomic issues.
I. Economic Foundations of International Legal Cooperation
In line with earlier work, we examine the topic of international
macroeconomic cooperation from a rational choice perspective, in which we assume
that states have well-defined interests and engage in cooperation to the extent that
they can advance those interests and to the extent that cooperation can be made
self-enforcing. International law is thus endogenous to the interests of the states
rather than an exogenous force that compels states to act contrary to their
interests.5
A state’s interest is, of course, derived from the interests of its component
parts—citizens, interest groups, government institutions, and so forth. Some
combination of these interests, we assume, will define the state’s conception of the
“social welfare,” and thus the objectives that the state pursues in any given policy
area. Economists sometimes posit, for example, that states maximize aggregate
national economic welfare, which corresponds roughly to the maximization of
national income.6 By this metric, the well-being of all producer and consumer
interests affected by economic activity “counts” equally for policymakers. It is also
common to suppose that states maximize a “political” welfare function in which
various groups have different degrees of influence.7 The differences in influence can
result because some groups are well-organized politically and others are not, or
because particular groups are viewed as particularly deserving of state assistance
(the poor, for example). In still other contexts, states may be imagined to pursue a
welfare goal defined in relation to some subsidiary policy goal(s), such as a loss
function embodying an inflation target and an output target.8
For our most recent statement of our approach, see Eric A. Posner & Alan Sykes, ECONOMIC
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Harvard, forthcoming 2013).
6 See, e.g., Harry G. Johnson, Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation, 21 REV. ECON. STUD. 142 (1953).
7 See, e.g., Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, Protection for Sale, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 833 (1994);
Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, An Economic Theory of GATT, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 215 (1999).
8 See, e.g., Olivier Jean Blanchard & Stanley Fischer, LECTURES ON MACROECONOMICS 567-69 (1989).
5
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Whatever the welfare objective, it is a commonplace in the academic
literature, and seemingly quite realistic in practice, to assume that states pursue the
interests of their own citizens without as much (if any) regard for the well-being of
foreigners. Opportunities for international cooperation – and thus for international
law – thereby arise if the policies pursued by states acting unilaterally have positive
and negative consequences for other states (externalities). When some activity or
policy imposes negative externalities on other states (for example, cross-border
pollution), states acting unilaterally will tend to engage in too much of the activity,
and states can benefit by agreeing to abate the negative externality. When an
activity or policy imposes positive externalities on other states (such as
conservation of biodiversity), states acting unilaterally will tend to engage in too
little of the activity, and can benefit by agreeing to increase it.9
Cooperation can arise in different ways. The most straightforward is through
formal treaties among the affected states. In other areas, states may informally
converge on customary behavior that reflects a useful form of cooperation
(customary international law). In still other situations, informal promises and
handshakes among public officials may be all that is necessary (soft law). 10 As we
proceed through the issues in this paper, we will see that each type of “law” has
played some role in the macroeconomic arena.
For cooperation of any sort to emerge, however, all cooperating states must
benefit from it. The requirement that states be better off by cooperating rather than
by opting out and pursuing their best unilateral alternative may be termed the
“participation constraint.”11
In addition, international cooperation is possible only when it is “selfenforcing.” International law has no third party enforcer akin to a court or sheriff
with the ability to seize assets or lock up violators. With rare exceptions, the failure
of a state to abide by international law is not punished or sanctioned by force.
Instead, cooperation is almost always sustained by mutual threats of defection from
the regime (or another, linked regime) – an implicit threat that if one state cheats,
others will do the same and the benefits of cooperation will be lost.12

Posner & Sykes, supra at __.
For a lengthy treatment of the role of soft-law in international financial regulation, see Chris
Brummer, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2012).
11 See Posner & Sykes, supra at _.
12 See id. at _.
9
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For cooperation to be sustainable through such self-enforcement strategies,
each country must gain more, at each point in time, by continuing to cooperate than
by “cheating.” Cooperation is thus easier when the long-term benefits of cooperation
are greater and the short-term gains from cheating are smaller. Related, cooperation
is easier when states value the future relatively highly (they have a low “discount
rate”). It is also easier when cheating is easily detected and the rules governing
cooperation are clear, and harder when the rules are vague or complex and cheating
may be harder to identify. Finally, cooperation may become unstable because of
“shocks” – changes in circumstances that increase the returns to short term cheating
or reduce the benefits of long term cooperation. 13 We will have much more to say
about such matters in later sections.
II. A Successful Cooperative Regime: International Trade
A. Background
The World Trade Organization (WTO), successor to the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), has 155 members at this writing.14 Since the formation
of GATT in 1947, international trade in goods and services has exploded, growing
considerably more rapidly than global output. From 1948 to 1998, trade in goods
increased by 6 percent per year in real terms, while global output increased by 3.9
percent per year.15 This growth of international commerce is widely attributable to
a reduction in barriers to international trade pursuant to the GATT/WTO system.16
Average tariff rates on dutiable imports have declined in developed countries, for
example, from an average of 40% or so at the founding of GATT to 5% or less
today.17 Over the same period, the membership of WTO/GATT has grown steadily,
as have the scope of the legal commitments undertaken by its members.
With a few minor bumps in the road, the liberalization of trade since the
founding of GATT has steadily increased, with each successive negotiating “round”
bringing about further tariff cuts and additional liberalization commitments on
See id. at _.
See Members and Observers, WTO, (May 10, 2012),
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm.
15 Growth, jobs, development and better international relations, WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min99_e/english/book_e/stak_e_3.htm.
16 One scholar attempted to show statistically that the law did not in fact cause the reduction in trade
barriers, which occurred independently. See Andrew Rose, Do We Really Know that the WTO Increases
Trade?, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 98 (2004). However, his empirical method has been persuasively debunked;
see Judith Goldstein, Michael Rivers & Michael Tomz, Comment, Do We Really Know that the WTO
Increases Trade, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 2005 (2007).
17 See John H. Jackson, William J. Davey & Alan O. Sykes, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 5-6 (5th
ed. 2008).
13
14
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matters such as non-tariff barriers and trade in services. By contrast, the era prior to
GATT was characterized by waves of protectionism, such as the Smoot Hawley Tariff
of 1930 in the United States, which substantially raised U.S. tariffs and precipitated a
round of stiff retaliatory increases abroad.18
By almost any account, therefore, multilateral cooperation on international
trade since the founding of GATT has been remarkably successful.19 In this section,
we detail the basic logic of its economic structure, and suggest why international
trade is an issue area that is particularly suited to stable international cooperation.
It will serve as a nice contrast to the macroeconomic policy areas that we discuss in
later sections.
B. The Gains from Cooperation on Trade Policy
The economic structure of international trade agreements has received a
great deal of attention from prominent international economists. The seminal early
paper was written by the Chicago economist Harry Johnson, who considered the
strategic interaction between two countries, each large enough to influence the
prices foreign exporters receive for their exports (the “large country” assumption).20
Johnson posited that each nation maximized its national income, and observed that
large countries could enhance their national incomes by imposing positive tariffs,
taking the behavior of the other nation to be fixed (the “Nash equilibrium”
assumption). The reason is that in response to a tariff increase, foreign exporters
will cut their prices somewhat as demand for their exports weakens. Thus,
foreigners absorb part of the tariff, and the tariff revenue thus arises in part at the
expense of foreigners, who do not “count” in the national income calculus, and
whose income loss is thus ignored by a national income maximizing government.
Johnson proved that in Nash equilibrium, each nation would charge a positive,
“optimal tariff.” Another way to understand Johnson’s result is that the consumers
of any large country collectively have a degree of “monopsony” power over the price

Id. See Krugman, Obstfeld & Melitz, supra note _, at 516-517 (explaining the Smooth Hawley Tariff
of 1930 and subsequent national protectionism).
19 Whether global cooperation can achieve further liberalization, however, is unclear. In recent years,
much of the negotiating action has shifted into various preferential trading arrangements such as
free trade areas, which are permitted under GATT Article XXIV. And, as of this writing, protectionist
sentiment and actions by countries seem to be gaining ground. See e.g., IMF’s Lagarde Urges Caution
Over Protectionism,CHI. TRIB., July 9, 2012, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-0709/business/sns-rt-us-indonesia-lagardebre86903f-20120709_1_imf-s-lagarde-protectionismcaution;
Pascal
Lamy,
Lamy
Cautions
over
Protectionism,
WTO (May
2012),
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl232_e.htm.
20 See Johnson, supra note _.
18
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of imports. The consumers may be unable to organize privately to exploit this
monopsony power, but their government can do so through the use of tariffs.
Johnson further noted, however, that global income declines as a result of
such tariffs (free trade maximizes global income and the exploitation of monopsony
power reduces global income). Accordingly, in Johnson’s model, the two countries
could both benefit from an agreement to eschew tariffs, following which they might
split the increase in global income in such a way as to make each better off than
before.21
More modern theorists have built upon Johnson’s insight, while questioning
his assumption of national income maximization. Among other things, if
governments were all national income maximizers, then trade agreements would
provide for free trade, which they do not.22 Thus, more recent work on trade
agreements commonly posits that governments maximize a welfare function that
includes “political economy” weights, whereby the incomes of certain groups are
given more weight in the welfare calculus.23 Certain industries and unions may be
well-organized and influential politically, for example, while other industries and
consumers may be poorly organized and less influential. Trade agreements
negotiated under these circumstances may well retain pockets of tariffs and other
forms of protection from foreign competition.
Nevertheless, the modern political economy theories retain an essential
insight of Johnson’s work – “large” nations acting unilaterally will ignore the harm
imposed on foreign exporters by trade policies that restrict imports and thus reduce
the prices received by foreign exporters. This externality is ubiquitous and results
from the trade policy actions of any large nation. Because the externality is negative,
theory predicts that nations acting unilaterally will be excessively protectionist.
International cooperation to liberalize trade is valuable, therefore, and international
cooperation through trade agreements will systematically lead to greater
liberalization, precisely as we observe in practice.
C. Self-Enforcement in Trade Agreements
Negotiations under WTO/GATT auspices involve the exchange of reciprocal
tariff concessions. Nations approach each other regarding the markets in which
If the countries were asymmetric in size, however, side payments might be required to secure the
participation of the larger country. See id. at __.
22 This proposition assumes the availability of any necessary side payments among asymmetric
countries. See id. at _.
23 See Grossman & Helpman, supra note _; Bagwell & Staiger, supra note _.
21
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their exporters would like to secure better access. Country A will agree to liberalize
its market for, say, computers, in return for a reciprocal concession on, say, textiles.
Negotiations in practice cover thousands of products (and now service sectors as
well under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)24).
As a result of this exchange of concessions, and because of the participation
constraint, all of the “large” countries (think of large countries as the countries
about whose trade policies other nations care) will both give and receive trade
policy concessions. These concessions matter importantly to their own exporters
(concessions received) and to foreign exporters (concessions given). This fact
immediately suggests the possibility of a self-enforcing regime: should country A
cheat on a concession that matters to country B, country B will respond by cheating
on a concession that matters to country A.
In the simple two-country, two good models popular with economists, only
one concession runs in each direction, and each country can adopt the simple
strategy of retracting its concession in response to cheating by the other. Because
cooperation is jointly valuable, this outcome hurts both countries, and thus
cooperation is sustainable unless the short-term gains from cheating become too
great, perhaps in response to some political shock.25
In the real world context with dozens of countries and thousands of goods,
the basic logic of self-enforcement remains the same – cheating by one country
causes it to lose valuable concessions made to it by others. In fact, the large number
of concessions in the WTO/GATT system tends to support sustained cooperation,
because even if a nation is tempted to cheat on one or two of them, it typically does
not want the system to unravel altogether. All nations thus have an interest in
cabining disputes to protect the broader gains from cooperation on vast numbers of
other matters.
The WTO dispute settlement system helps to orchestrate cooperation.26 It
has an arbitration-like procedure to identify violations, and to calibrate the
allowable retaliation in response to any proven violation. The system also has the
capacity to resolve disputes over the meaning of the rules, so that disagreements
See Services Trade, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/serv_e.htm.
See Kyle Bagwell & Robert Staiger, THE ECONOMICS OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM ch. 6 (2002).
26 For empirical analysis of this institution that suggests that it is fairly effective, see Marc L. Busch &
Eric
Reinhart,
Trade
Brief
on
The
WTO
Dispute
Settlement
(2004),
http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/mlb66/SIDA.pdf; Chad P. Bown, SELF-ENFORCING TRADE
(2009).
24
25
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over ambiguous legal obligations do not degenerate into trade wars. But the basic
structure is as theory would predict – when a cheater is identified and refuses to
cure misconduct, aggrieved nations can suspend commensurate concession made to
the cheater in retaliation.27 The stability and growth of WTO/GATT membership,
and the success of the institution in bringing down global trade barriers, is a
testament to the success of this self-enforcing structure.
Other features of the international trade regime have also contributed to the
success of cooperation. Trade barriers are in large measure fairly transparent –
exporters know if they have to pay a tariff to get their goods across a foreign border,
and what the amount is. They can tell when a quota is keeping their goods out of a
potential market. One can also write tariff commitments in simple and clear terms –
the tariff on widgets shall not exceed 10% of their value, for example. Finally, the
WTO/GATT system includes some explicit mechanisms to adjust the bargain in
response to shocks. Explicit authority for tariff renegotiation is contained in GATT
Article XXVIII, for example, and nations may deviate temporarily from tariff
commitments if an importing industry is suffering serious injury due to an import
surge under GATT Article XIX.28 Such rules create “pressure valves” that allow
strong political demands for deviation from commitments to be addressed without
causing cooperation to unravel across the board.
The discussion above has emphasized cooperation under WTO/GATT
auspices, but of course dozens of other international trade agreements also operate
successfully in accordance with similar logic. The United States alone now has a
dozen or so free-trade agreements with various nations, the most important being
NAFTA. Negotiations toward a larger Trans-Pacific Partnership are now in progress.
Almost all other nations also belong to various preferential trading arrangements.
An important dimension of international cooperation under the Articles of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is also driven by the gains from international
cooperation on trade. Pursuant to IMF Article VIII(2)(a), members are not permitted
(without permission of the Fund) to impose restrictions on the conversion of
domestic to foreign currency when needed to finance “current account”
transactions, that is, transactions in goods and services (as opposed to capital
transactions such as real estate or stock investments).29 This provision was also a
See Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute
Settlement in the World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S179 (2002).
28 Id. Alan O. Sykes, Protectionism as a "Safeguard": A Positive Analysis of the GATT "Escape Clause"
with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255 (1991).
29 See Krugman, Obstfeld & Melitz, supra note _, at 300-01.
27
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response to pre-GATT practices by many nations. For example, prior to the creation
of the IMF, some nations established multiple exchange rate systems that required
domestic currency to be purchased at inflated rates for certain trade transactions,
mimicking the effect of a tariff.30 By ending such practices, IMF Article VIII facilitates
trade cooperation by increasing the transparency of trade barriers and making
commitments under WTO/GATT auspices more credible.31 This feature of the IMF
system has proven quite successful and robust over time, even as other aspects of
IMF cooperation on exchange rates has failed (as we discuss below).
III. A Quasi-Successful Regime: International Capital Adequacy Regulation
A. Background
The financial crisis that began in 2007 has had a devastating effect on the
economies of many major countries. Global GDP fell by 1.9 percent in real terms in
2009, after having grown by three percent annually over the previous nine years.32
In the United States, the unemployment rate reached 10.1 percent in 2009, while in
the European Union it reached 9.7 percent in 2010.33 The recovery has also been
anemic. The U.S. economy is expected to grow by only 2 percent in 2012, while
Europe has fallen back into recession, in large part because of the sovereign debt
crisis.34
Economists generally agree that the severe downturn was precipitated by
the failure or potential failure of important financial institutions, and the resulting
tightness (and feared future tightness) in credit markets. The root cause was a
dramatic reduction in the value of certain assets held by major banks and other
financial institutions, largely in the form of mortgage-backed securities. During the
housing market bubble in the United States, many lenders issued mortgages to
questionable borrowers whose ability to repay was suspect, often under adjustable
rate contracts with unaffordable future payments. They did so in part with the (ex
To a degree, these practices continued after the formation of the IMF and were a source of
numerous disputes. See Kenneth W. Dam, THE RULES OF THE GAME 131-32 (1982).
31 IMF Art. VIII.
32 Tatiana Didier et al, How Resilient Were Emerging Economies to the Global Crisis (World Bank Policy
Research
Working
Paper
5637),
SANTA
CRUZ
INST.
INT’L
ECON.,
(April
2011),sciie.ucsc.edu/JIMF4/WPS5637_Schmukler.pdf. Further data is available at Tracking the Global
Financial Crisis: An Analysis of the IMF’s World Economic Outlook, BROOK., (May 2009),
http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2009/05_financial_crisis_linn.aspx.
33 Suzanne Casaux & Alessandro Turrini, Post-Crisis Unemployment Developments: US and EU
Approaching?,
EUR.
COMM’N,
(ECFIN
Economic
Brief,
Issue
13,
May
2011),
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_briefs/2011/pdf/eb13_en.pdf.
34 Edward P. Lazear, The Worst Economic Recovery in History, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 2012, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303816504577311470997904292.html.
30
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post inaccurate) expectation that housing prices would continue to rise, and that
borrowers could simply refinance and use home equity to cover their obligations. In
addition, the lenders knew that they would not ultimately hold the mortgages
themselves, but that they would be sold off and packaged as mortgage-backed
securities to be purchased by other investors. Enormous numbers of these securities
were marketed to financial institutions around the world.35 Foreign holdings of
Fannie and Freddie backed securities increased from $186 billion in 1998 to $875
billion in 2004, and foreign holdings of asset-backed securities reach $835 billion at
the height of the boom.36
When the housing price bubble burst, many houses fell in value just as
increased payments under adjustable rate mortgages began to become due. Many
borrowers defaulted, and the resulting oversupply of housing for sale caused prices
to fall even more rapidly. Even though many borrowers remained solvent and
continued to service their mortgages, no one knew exactly which mortgage-backed
securities were backed by defaulting borrowers, and the value of all of them fell
precipitously.37
This decline in the value of mortgage-backed securities occurred within a
regulatory environment in which banks (and some other financial institutions) are
ordinarily required by national regulators to maintain a “capital” cushion to protect
depositors against a decline in the value of the bank’s assets. The logic of this
“capital adequacy regulation” is that when the value of assets falls, the bank’s
shareholders (and perhaps bondholders) will suffer the loss, and the bank will still
have enough money to pay off its liabilities to depositors and certain other
creditors.38 Capital adequacy regulation ensures that the bank’s net worth is
sufficiently high that the bank will not become insolvent as a result of moderate
shocks to the value of its assets.
Following a drop in the value of assets, regulators in principle will require
banks to increase their capital holdings back to the required level by raising capital

Brummer, supra note _ at 211-213 (outlining the 2008 financial crisis); see also Krugman, Obstfeld
& Melitz supra note _, at 543.
36 See Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 104 (2011) (“Inquiry Report”);
Steven B. Kamin & Laurie Pounder DeMarco, How Did a Domestic Housing Slump Turn into a Global
Financial Crisis 8 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve International Finance Discussion Paper
No 994), FED. RES., (Jan. 2010), www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2010/994/ifdp994.pdf.
37 See Inquiry Report, supra note _, at 222-223 (finding that although a relatively small percentage of
homeowners were actually defaulting, seventy-five to ninety percent of securities based off
mortgages were downgraded to “junk”); see also, Krugman, Obstfeld & Melitz, supra note _, at 603.
38 See Mishkin, supra note _, at 231–232.
35
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or retaining earnings. Banks that are unable to do so may be closed or taken over by
their governments (as happened to a number of banks during the financial crisis).
B. The Gains From Cooperation on Capital Adequacy Requirements
The “welfare objectives” implicit in capital adequacy regulation are
straightforward—a desire by national authorities to limit undue risk-taking by
financial institutions, and to ensure that banks remain capable of meeting their
obligations to depositors. The economic justification for such regulation is a belief
that the owners and managers of banks are not monitored adequately by their
creditors to ensure that they do not engage in excessive risk taking. An important
reason is the widespread institution of deposit insurance, which dulls the incentive
of depositors to worry about a prospect of bank insolvency, and also explains why
governments regulate to protect their treasuries. Moreover, even absent deposit
insurance, creditors may face a collective action problem in monitoring banks, and
the temptation to free ride may allow banks excessive leeway to gamble with other
people’s money – a gamble in which the bank enjoys the upside and others suffer
much of the downside.39
Capital adequacy regulation originated at the national level. But in the
modern economy, capital investment has become more and more mobile
internationally. Many developed countries have increasingly relaxed so-called
“capital controls” on foreign investment, allowing investment capital to flow
wherever returns are the highest.40 The result is a set of significant externality
problems with regulation.
First, significant numbers of creditors of domestic financial institutions may
well be foreign nationals. As usual, theory suggests that the interest of foreign
nationals may not be taken into account adequately by national regulators (at least
to the degree that the national government does not insure their interests), which
may lead to a tendency toward under-regulation when nations act unilaterally.
Second, and probably more important, the regulated entities themselves are
backed by mobile capital. If the United States raises capital requirements on major
banks in New York, for example, those banks may well have the capacity to move
their operations to London. To the degree that political officials value the presence
of domestic financial institutions, and those institutions have a credible threat to
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move their operations abroad in response to stricter regulation, regulators may be
further discouraged from imposing appropriate capital requirements.
These problems became increasingly prominent in the 1970s and 1980s,
finally resulting in the first Basel Accord (Basel I) in 1988, in which the so-called G10 economies agreed on minimum capital requirements to be implemented in their
domestic laws.41 The approach to regulation was modified and broadened to more
countries in the Basel II Accord of 2004,42 which was in the process of being
implemented when the financial crisis emerged. Among other things, Basel II added
“market discipline,” based on disclosure obligations, to the regulatory arsenal.
Subsequent to the financial crisis, yet a third agreement on capital adequacy
regulation has been reached – Basel III – which introduces some further rules on
bank liquidity and leverage.43
C. Self-Enforcement in Capital Adequacy Cooperation
The Basel system is weakly institutionalized. Governments established a
committee in the 1970s that would become known as the Basel Committee, which
consists of the central bankers and financial regulators of its members. The
Committee has no legal power. It operates by consensus with the understanding
that when it reaches agreements, those agreements will be independently
implemented through regulation or national legislation in the member countries.44
The complex details of these arrangements need not detain us. We simply
offer the Basel accords as an example of a quasi-successful regime of cooperation on
macroeconomic-related issues. The regime is partially successful in that it represents
a fairly stable (approaching 25 years) approach to a well-defined international
externality problem attributable to global capital mobility. It responds to the underregulation that theory predicts will arise absent international cooperation by
obliging its members to take concrete measures to require increased bank capital, as
well as to engage in certain collateral policies that reduce the riskiness of financial
institutions, and by allocating supervisory authority over internationally active
banks. The rules are in considerable measure precise and clear (Basel III increases
the common stock requirement for banks to 4.5% of assets, for example45). The
See Krugman, Obstfeld & Melitz, supra note _, 600-01.
See id.
43 The Basel III rules are summarized at Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Reforms – Basel III,
BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3/b3summarytable.pdf (“Basel III
Rules”). For historical background, see Duncan Wood, GOVERNING GLOBAL BANKING (2005).
44 Wood, supra note _, at 45.
45 See Basel III Rules, supra note _.
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system is self-enforcing in the sense that significant deviation by national regulators
(which we do not anticipate in ordinary times) will produce substantial pressure for
regulators elsewhere to deviate. And national governments have actually
implemented the Basel rules, incorporating them into domestic law and regulatory
practice where presumably they have had effects on behavior.46
The regime has been quite unsuccessful in certain respects as well – after all,
it failed to ward off the recent financial crisis. Basel II failed to result in greater
capitalization of banks; indeed, it appears to have enabled large financial
institutions to reduce capitalization by a fairly substantial amount.47
There are three important reasons. First, bank regulators operating under
Basel I and II simply did not appreciate the systemic risk associated with innovative
financial instruments such as mortgage-backed securities. The risk associated with
these instruments was far greater than either regulators or market participants
realized, and thus the risk posture of many major financial institutions was far more
aggressive than the capital adequacy standards in place were designed to address.48
Second, a number of scholars believe that Basel was “captured” by large
banks, which manipulated the process in order to ensure that they would be lightly
regulated.49 One of the innovations of Basel II was a rule that permitted banks to use
their own models in order to calculate credit risk instead of complying with the
default capital adequacy standards, which were quite crude. Only large banks could
afford to run those models and take advantage of this rule, and those banks were
able to reduce their capitalization while other banks were required to increase
capitalization.50 One scholar traces this rule and related rules to an intense lobbying
campaign undertaken by the large banks.51
See Wood, supra note _, at 99 (discussing the impact of the 1988 accord on the market), and at 15357 (surveying the effects of the regime as a whole).
47 Ranjit Lall, Why Basel II Failed and Why Any Basel III Is Doomed (Global Economic Governance
Working Paper), 7, GLOBAL ECON. GOVERNANCE (OCT. 2009),
http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/GEG-Working-paper-RanjitLall.pdf.
48 See Inquiry Report, supra note _, at 20-22, 99-100.
49 See, e.g., Lall, supra note _, at 11 (arguing that financial institutions that were the first movers in
counseling the Basel Committee exerted the most influence); Stephany Griffith-Jones & Avinash
Persaud, The Political Economy of Basel II, 5, THE U.N. ECON. COMM’N FOR LATIN AM., (Apr. 2003),
http://www.eclac.cl/noticias/discursos/2/12152/Griffith-Jones-Persaud.pdf (arguing that the
limited regulation of large banks relative to smaller banks is an indication of industry capture).
50 See Inquiry Report, supra note _, at 7.
51 See id. For related accounts of the “failure” of Basel, see Wood, supra note _ (arguing that United
State weakened regulation to advance interests of U.S. banks); see also Magnus Bertling Bjerke,
Experts, Banks and Politics, 84, 91-92, INT’L REL. SECURITY NETWORK, (2007),
46
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Third, international cooperation in this area has also been hampered by
another fundamental problem rooted in the very nature of capital adequacy
regulation – a time inconsistency problem. In popular discourse, this problem is also
known as the “too big to fail” issue. If the incentives associated with capital
adequacy regulation are to perform properly, regulated institutions must believe
that the rules will be enforced if the institution finds itself in financial trouble –
shareholders will be wiped out, the bank will be closed and liquidated, and so forth.
If a financial crisis afflicts an enormous financial institution, however, much less a
cluster of them as occurred during the financial crisis, the threat to enforce the rules
can lose its credibility. The disruption to the economy from closing large financial
institutions may be extensive, producing a crisis of confidence that produces a run
on other financial institutions and imperils their liquidity. In addition, the costs to
the treasury of closing big institutions and making good on deposit insurance
promises can be enormous. The result is that regulators can be dissuaded from
enforcing the rules in the event of a systemic crisis, and central banks are pushed
inexorably toward supplying financial institutions with the resources to cover their
losses (a “bailout”).52
If major financial institutions can anticipate this scenario (and they surely
can, since it has happened), they will know that in hard times the rules will not be
enforced. That will diminish the incentive to avoid excessive risk-taking and
undermine the integrity of the regulatory regime.
For these reasons, we suspect that international cooperation under a regime
such as Basel III can only be expected to work well in ordinary times, when
occasionally banks may find themselves in trouble but the system as a whole is not
threatened. Its ability to avoid large, systemic crises, by contrast, is more suspect.53
Systemic crises might be avoided, to be sure, by imposing such substantial
capital requirements that all banks can be insulated from massive unanticipated
shocks. The costs of restricting bank activity to this extent may easily exceed the
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=48049 (arguing that Basel II was excessively influenced by narrow
national interests because of the differing national regulatory regimes); Griffith-Jones & Persaud,
supra note _ (arguing that developed countries used the process to take advantage of developing
countries by disincentivizing investments in developing nations that would diversify portfolios).
52 Inquiry Report supra note _, at 57, 228, 369 (providing an example of the costs of potential
depository runs).
53 This seems to be the conclusion of a book-length examination of the Basel system, which describes
the success of the system as “limited”: it has not prevented crises but it has contributed to
international financial stability. Wood, supra note _, at 4.
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benefits, however, and in any case may not be politically viable. Alternatively,
regulators might seek to become more deeply involved in managing bank asset
portfolios by placing more restrictions or prohibitions on particular types of risky
investments. The ability of regulators to do so in a useful fashion may be doubted,
however, particularly in light of the fact that the assets that nearly brought down the
financial system in 2007-2008—mortgage-backed securities—were not recognized
for the risks they created until it was far too late. Lastly, as some have advocated,54
the largest banks “too big to fail” might be broken up into smaller banks, but the
costs of fracturing such large national or global financial institutions may be a
significant loss of scale economies and other efficiencies, and may again be a
political non-starter.
IV. A Failed Regime: Fixed Exchange Rates (and the Euro-Zone?)
We now move into more complex areas of macroeconomic policy in which
international cooperation has proven a failure despite the presence of important
international externalities. As we shall see, the complexity of the policy issues in
play is a key reason for the failure of cooperation, although not the only reason. In
this section, we consider various historical efforts of the international community to
establish a regime of fixed exchange rates. After some background discussion, we
consider the gold standard, the Bretton Woods system under the IMF, and the role
of currency unions with emphasis on the Euro-zone. The next section considers a
broader set of issues pertaining to monetary (and fiscal) policy cooperation.
A. Background on Exchange Rates
An “exchange rate” is the price at which one national currency may be sold
for another. From the perspective of a national of any country, the set of exchange
rates on various currencies are simply the prices of foreign monies.
In a world without foreign commerce, exchange rates would be of no interest
to anyone; all transactions would be domestic and no one would have any need for
foreign money. But once trade in goods, services, and capital assets becomes
possible, exchange rates become important. Consider a seller of goods in the United
States and a buyer in Europe. The seller would like to exchange goods for dollars,
which she can spend in the United States. But the buyer will normally own Euros. So
See, e.g., Safe, Accountable, Fair, and Efficient Banking Act of 2010, 111 th Cong. 2d, S. 3241
(proposing legislation that breaks up banks that are too big to fail), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111s3241is/pdf/BILLS-111s3241is.pdf; Jonathan R. Macey &
James P. Holdcroft, Jr., Failure is an Option: An Ersatz-Antitrust Approach to Financial Regulation, 120
YALE L. J. 1368 (2011) (arguing that when a bank becomes too big to fail, it should be broken up).
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in order to engage in a transaction, either the buyer will need to exchange euros for
dollars and give the seller dollars, or the seller will need to exchange the euros she
receives for dollars. Whichever the case, one party will need to exchange local
currency for foreign currency. To do so, the party will typically go to an
intermediary such as a bank, which owns both types of currency. The intermediary
will offer to make an exchange at the prevailing exchange rate.
1. Market-Determined Exchange Rates
What determines the exchange rate? Consider a simple setting, without any
government intervention by assumption, where people in two countries (Europe
and America) trade goods and services across borders but do not trade capital
assets (again by assumption). Europeans will sell goods and services to Americans,
for example, only as long as Americans sell goods and services in return that
Europeans want to buy, and vice versa. Trade must “balance” in the sense that the
value of what the United States imports from Europe equals the value of what the
United States exports to Europe.55 If Europeans start buying more imports than they
sell in return, the excess demand for U.S. dollars to make the purchases will cause
the dollar to appreciate relative to the Euro, which in turn will cause American
exports to become more expensive for Europeans, which will cause Europeans to
import less, and thus trade to return to balance. In this simple framework, the
dollar-euro exchange rate is the relative price of the two currencies that balances
export/import demand and supply.56
In turn, any exchange rate movements under these circumstances reflect
changes in export and import demand and supply factors. If, for example, prices rise
in the United States (maybe a strike or storm reduces the cotton crop), then
European demand for the now-more expensive goods will decline. Europeans will
then demand fewer dollars, and the dollar will depreciate. If Europeans become
more enamored with American goods, then they will demand more dollars to buy
those goods, and the dollar will appreciate. If American industry becomes more
productive, then U.S. goods will become cheaper, Europeans will demand more of
them and thus the dollars to buy them, and the dollar will appreciate. If the
American government imposes tariffs on European goods, then Americans will

Formal models of balanced trade typically omit exchange rates altogether; they simply require that
the value of imports equal the value of exports measured in terms of some numeraire good. See
Avinash K. Dixit & Victor Norman, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 80 et. seq. (1980).
56 With more than two countries, bilateral trade need not balance but aggregate imports and exports
for each country would balance, and equilibrium exchange rates would ensure this market-clearing
condition holds in each country.
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demand fewer Europeans goods and the euros to buy them, and the dollar will
appreciate causing American exports to decline as well. And so on.
In the real world, balanced trade does not necessarily occur because the
purchase of goods and services from abroad is not the only possible use of foreign
money. When Europeans start buying up more American exports, Americans might
take their additional euros and use them not to buy European goods and services
but to buy European capital assets, including European sovereign and corporate
bonds, stocks, real estate, and so forth. Such transactions in capital assets afford an
alternative use for foreign currency, and so the equilibrium exchange rate (without
government intervention) is not the rate that balances trade in goods and services,
but that balances the demand and supply of foreign money, a component of which is
associated with capital transactions.
National income accounting distinguishes between the “current account,”
which refers to trade in goods and services, and the “capital account,” which refers
to investments of various sorts. In our example above, Europe has a current account
deficit if it imports more goods and services than it exports, but a capital account
surplus because Americans use the surplus euros to purchase European capital
assets. The exchange rate may remain stable under these circumstances even
though trade flows alone are unbalanced.
The willingness of investors to use foreign exchange to buy foreign capital
assets depends on the relative rate of return on investment across countries. If the
interest rate on bonds in Europe is high relative to that in the United States, for
example, then European bonds will be more attractive, other things being equal, and
Americans are more likely to buy them. In valuing European assets, Americans will
take account of all the other factors that affect their expected return—for example,
future price levels, demand, trade barriers, and productivity. Absent restrictions on
international capital flows, exchange rate equilibrium requires that the riskadjusted rate of return on assets denominated in each currency be the same;
otherwise, capital flows will chase higher returns until parity is achieved.57
2. The Exchange Rate with Government Intervention
It is not immediately obvious why governments should wish to intervene in
exchange markets. The market is extremely liquid—trillions of dollars of foreign
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exchange are traded every day. And nothing we have said so far suggests that the
market creates negative externalities.
Nonetheless, governments have intervened frequently in foreign exchange
markets, and even when they do not consciously “intervene,” their policies may
affect exchange rates. The mechanism of direct intervention is fairly simple. If a
nation wishes to lower the price of its currency, it sells that currency for foreign
currencies – the increased supply of its currency will tend to depress the price, just
as increased supply into any market with fixed demand will tend to lower prices. A
nation that sells its currency and accumulates foreign currency builds up “foreign
exchange reserves.” Likewise, if a nation wishes to increase the price of its currency,
it reverses the process and sells foreign exchange reserves to buy up its currency. By
creating additional demand for its own currency, the nation should cause its
currency to appreciate.58
When nations intervene for the purpose of altering the exchange rate, they
do so for a number of reasons relating to the fact that short-term exchange rates can
fluctuate dramatically. One is that firms may be unwilling to engage in foreign trade
because of the attendant risk. 59 An American firm that promises to pay €1,000 for a
widget in one week, may be willing to enter the contract at the current exchange
rate, where the dollar cost is, say, $1,200, but not at an exchange rate where the cost
could be $1,500 or $2,000 for the €1,000 needed to consummate the contract. Even
if current exchange rates were unbiased predictors of future rates, so that adverse
shifts were no more likely than favorable shifts, risk-averse traders would curtail
their trading activity due to this “exchange risk.”
To address the problem of exchange risk, countries have tried at various
times to maintain a relatively constant exchange rate through government
intervention. A country may do this unilaterally by “pegging” its currency to that of a
foreign country, such as the United States. The country attempts to calculate the
long-run exchange rate and then use government intervention to counter short-run
deviations from it.60 Alternatively, the government may intervene in currency
markets simply to dampen volatility and reduce risk by countering any short-term
price swings.
The empirical importance of exchange risk in trade is unclear, but
economists doubt that this problem is as serious as it first appears in modern
See Mishkin, supra note _, at 529-533.
See Peter H. Lindert, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 432 ( 9th ed. 1991).
60 For more on pegging see Mishkin, supra note _, at 552-553.
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markets due to a large market in derivatives that enable firms to hedge cheaply
against exchange rate risk.61 The firm in the above example can simply enter the
forward market and purchase the necessary euros at a determinate rate for delivery
on the date when payment under the contract is required.
A second concern regarding short-term exchange rate fluctuations is that
they may send false signals to the market that distort resource allocation. 62
Governments may fear, for example, that speculators will distort the price of its
currency relative to some “true” value that reflects long-term market equilibrium.63
Such behavior might cause investors to invest in the wrong industries—for example,
in the export industry of a country whose currency has been artificially forced
down, but which will rise to its true value after the investments have been sunk. If
governments can perceive the true value of the currency, however, then they can
counter these short-term movements away from equilibrium rates and thus prevent
the price distortions. This can be true only if the government has better information
than the market does and can identify the “true” value of the exchange rate, which
many economists doubt.
Countries may also intervene in foreign exchange markets to increase
domestic employment by retarding imports and stimulating exports (through
devaluation), a policy that may effectively amount to cheating on trade
commitments.64 If Chile and Peru agree to eliminate tariffs on each other’s exports,
then each country will experience growth in its export sector, but import-competing
industries will suffer. The import-competing industries will then pressure the
governments to help them. If a government decides that it cannot renege on the
trade deal, it can at least temporarily produce an effect similar to that of a tariff by
devaluing its currency, making imports more expensive in terms of domestic
currency. Indeed, such a policy would help its exporters as well by making exports
cheaper in terms of foreign currency.65
In addition to these reasons for intervention aimed at altering exchange
rates, many government policies can affect exchange rates by changing the supply or
demand for domestic currency. For example, countries may prefer to keep certain
Lindert, supra note _, at 434.
See Richard N. Cooper, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 141-43 (1987).
63 Lindert supra note _, at 416-20.
64 See Cooper, supra note _.
65 The discussion here assumes that imports are priced in foreign currency and exports in domestic
currency, a condition that need not always hold. It also assumes that other prices do not adjust to
offset the exchange rate movement, another assumption that may not hold, especially in the “long
run.” We have more to say about such issues below.
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capital assets in domestic hands because of political and national security
sensitivities.66 As an illustration, the United States has refused to allow Chinese and
Middle Eastern entities to purchase sensitive installations such as ports.67 Other
countries have also limited foreign investment in marquee firms such as national
airlines. When investments are prohibited for such reasons, demand for the
domestic currency falls and the currency may depreciate.
Related, some countries limit foreign investment because experience has
taught that foreign investors may withdraw their investments precipitously when
problems arise. As the Asian financial crisis of the 1990s showed, the rapid
withdrawal of foreign capital can produce a collapse in local currency and asset
values, resulting in enormous economic dislocation. One way to control such
behavior is to limit the right of foreign investors to convert their currency into and
out of domestic currency for the purpose of buying or selling domestic investments,
a type of policy known as “capital controls,” which also have obvious exchange rate
implications.
Another possibility is that nations may wish to unload foreign reserves that
they fear may depreciate in the future. China has accumulated large dollar reserves
through the years, for example, and should China fear a future depreciation of the
dollar, it might sell them, which would have the effect of increasing the value of its
currency relative to the dollar.
Exchange rates are also affected by countercyclical policies. For example, a
country’s central bank may use monetary policy in an effort to stimulate its
economy. One way to do so is to make loans to banks at low interest rates, enabling
banks in turn to make cheaper loans to customers, thus stimulating borrowing and
investment. When a central bank loans money to banks, it effectively expands the
money supply, which naturally tends to lower the price of its money relative to
other things, including foreign currency. Likewise, low interest rates reduce the
return on investments in local assets denominated in the local currency, which may
lead investors to shift investment toward foreign capital assets. To do so, they must
buy foreign currency, which will also cause the value of foreign currency to
appreciate.

See, e.g., U.S. Department of the Treasury, The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States,
U.S.
DEP’T
TREAS.,
(Apr.
2012),
http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/international/pages/committee-on-foreign-investment-in-us.aspx.
67 See, e.g., Deborah L. Cohen, Overseas Oversight, 94 A.B.A.J. 22 (2008) (detailing U.S. government
vetoes of foreign takeovers of telecommunications, oil, and ports companies).
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B. Gains From Cooperation on Exchange Rate Movements
Thus far we have focused on reasons why a government may seek to
influence the price of its currency acting unilaterally, and how it may indirectly
influence its price through other policies. It is a short step to identifying
international externalities that result from policies that directly or indirectly move
the exchange rate.
First, short-term exchange rate fluctuations affect foreign actors as well as
domestic actors. To the degree that exchange risk is important in trade, one might
expect governments to undersupply efforts to reduce it because some of the benefits
flow to foreigners. Similarly, to the degree that short-term fluctuations send
incorrect signals to markets that distort resource allocation, some of the costs will
be borne by foreigners and once again we might expect governments to
undersupply policies aimed at avoiding exchange rate distortions.
Second and related, to the degree that exchange rates persistently deviate
from “equilibrium” values in ways that governments can identify, the actors whose
decisions are affected and who bear the costs of subsequent “corrections” in the
rates may be foreign investors or trading partners whose sunk investments are
imperiled by the return to equilibrium.
Third, and in line with some of the recent criticism of China’s policies to
prevent the appreciation of the RMB, any efforts by governments to devalue their
currency to stimulate exports and to protect import-competing industries will
impose costs on import-competing firms abroad and on foreign exporters. The net
effect of such policies on aggregate foreign welfare can be subtle,68 but there is little
doubt that from a political standpoint foreign nations may complain bitterly about
such actions. Indeed, unanticipated devaluations may effectively renege on trade
bargains made with other nations, as noted, at least until other prices adjust to
compensate.
Such policies may also push competitors toward policy interventions that
they would prefer not to undertake. If China maintains an artificially weak RMB
relative to the dollar to simulate exports, Brazil may be forced (politically) to do the
same with respect to the real lest its exports to the United States become
uncompetitive vis-à-vis Chinese exports. Thus, for example, in response to some
shock that lowers the value of the dollar, both China and Brazil may sell their own
See the discussion in Robert W. Staiger & Alan O. Sykes, “Currency Manipulation” and World Trade,
9 WORLD TRADE REV. 583 (2010).
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currencies and buy dollars to keep their currency values low, causing domestic
inflation that may have problematic internal effects.69
Fourth, the sorts of policies that indirectly affect exchange rates may also
impose costs on foreigners. When countries use investment restrictions and capital
controls, for example, foreign investors may suffer reduced investment
opportunities. Such effects again require that the potential capital-importing nation
be “large,” in the sense that a denial of access to its investment opportunities will
reduce the returns that foreign investors can make because they do not have equally
good opportunities elsewhere. These costs to foreign investors are neglected when
nations unilaterally set their policies regarding foreign investments.
Similarly, countercyclical policies that affect exchange rates can have various
externalities. In response to the financial crisis, for example, the United States has
adopted a loose monetary policy hoping to stimulate the economy, driving interest
rates on many investments in the United States to unprecedented low levels.
Investors have responded by seeking to invest abroad where interest rates are
higher. This flow of investment capital abroad is not always welcome. Various
foreign governments have recently complained, for example, that the inflow of
foreign investment capital is driving up the price of their currencies, forcing them to
intervene by selling their currencies to maintain export competitiveness.70 The
result is a concern for inflation. The capital inflows also raise fears of asset bubbles
that may eventually collapse and produce serious dislocation.
Various forms of cooperation can, in principle, ameliorate these externalities.
Some efforts are targeted at particular, problematic practices. With respect to
intervention that might undermine trade commitments, Article XV(4) of GATT
provides that members of GATT “shall not, by exchange action, frustrate the intent”
of GATT.71 Likewise, IMF Article IV(1)(iv) provides that members “shall…avoid
manipulating exchange rates…to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other
members.”72 Neither provision has ever been enforced in a meaningful way, but they

Maurice Obstfeld, The International Monetary System: Living with Asymmetry, 32-34, ECON.
LABORATORY SOFTWARE ARCHIVE (Nov. 2011),
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~obstfeld/The%20International%20Monetary%20System.pdf.
Obstfeld
assumes that sterilization is imperfect.
70
See Ronald McKinnon, Beggar Thy Neighbor Interest Rate Policies (Nov. 2010),
http://www.stanford.edu/~mckinnon/papers/Beggar%20thy%20neighbor%20interest%20rate%2
0policies.pdf.
71 GATT Art. XV(4).
72 IMF Art. IV(1)(iv).
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at least bespeak an awareness of how exchange rate measures can undermine a
liberal trading system.
Our focus in this section, however, is on various efforts through the years to
address some of the above-noted externalities by creating a system of fixed
exchange rates. Fixed exchange rates obviously eliminate the problems associated
with short-term volatility, and if rates are set properly (and adjusted if necessary)
toward the long-term “equilibrium” rate, the costs of sustained deviations from that
level and abrupt subsequent adjustments can be avoided. Likewise, fixed exchange
rates prevent devaluation for the purposes of undermining trade commitments.
Interestingly, however, efforts to create fixed exchange rates on a global scale
have proven failures. We now consider those efforts and the reasons for the lack of
success.
C. The Failure of Self-Enforcing Cooperation on Fixed Exchange Rates
We now address two significant efforts to maintain fixed exchange rates. The
first involved the “gold standard” of the early 1900s. This system waxed and waned,
and eventually collapsed around the time of the Great Depression. Then, following
World War II, a modified version of the gold standard was devised under the
auspices of the IMF. That arrangement too collapsed in the early 1970s, leaving
behind the modern system of floating rates that persists today.
1. The Gold Standard
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, most major countries
adhered to the gold standard. Under the gold standard, every country promised to
redeem its currency for gold. In the United States, for example, a person could
redeem a dollar for one twentieth of an ounce of gold from the U.S. Treasury. In
Great Britain, a pound was redeemable for a quarter of an ounce of gold. Thus, a
person who owned a pound could convert it into five dollars by exchanging the
pound for gold and the gold for dollars. In this way, the gold standard created a
system of fixed exchange rates.73
Countries were not bound by international law to adhere to the gold
standard. The standard emerged in a decentralized fashion as more and more
countries saw advantages in committing themselves to redeem their currencies in
gold, although policymakers saw the advantages of gold convertibility for
73
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international trade and investment as early as 1867 and agreed to move in that
direction.74 Probably the most important argument for using the gold standard is
that it introduced monetary stability, preventing countries from simply printing
currency and causing inflation. If the currency is linked to gold and a government
issues too much currency (promoting inflation), the holders of money will wish to
redeem it for gold. Aware of this prospect, monetary authorities exercise restraint in
the issuance of currency. The money supply then increases or decreases with the
supply of gold reserves, which was thought to be relatively stable. Many
governments were attracted to the gold standard for this reason alone, a domestic
benefit from the gold standard that did not depend on any international
cooperation.
A further advantage of the gold standard, however, was that when many
countries adopted it, a fixed exchange rate was established, which eliminated or
greatly reduced problems associated with exchange rate fluctuations. Thus, the gold
standard can be seen as a form of informal international cooperation over exchange
rates.
Modern scholarship suggests, however, that the supposed advantages of the
gold standard were greatly exaggerated.75 For one thing, governments were free to
leave the gold standard or (more commonly) to devalue their currency by
announcing that they would redeem it for smaller amounts of gold than in the past.
Thus, the gold standard did not really bind governments, and it did not create as
much exchange rate stability as people often think. In fact, periods of competitive
devaluations were observed, in which multiple nations sought to take advantage of
the way that devaluation can stimulate exports and reduce imports.
In addition, there is a disadvantage in linking the national money supply to
gold reserves. Over the long term, the money supply should increase at roughly the
same rate that the economy grows, so that people will have sufficient money to
engage in the greater number of transactions. But the supply of gold does not
depend on the size of the world economy, let alone the size of any particular
country’s economy, but varies depending on the technology of gold extraction and
the happenstance of gold discovery. Under the gold standard, the production of gold
varied greatly over time leading to periods of inflation and deflation.76 The gold
standard thus does not really lead to price stability – the value of money in terms of
Barry Eichengreen, International Policy Coordination: The Long View 6 (forthcoming).
See id.; Richard N. Cooper, The Gold Standard: Historical Facts and Future Prospects, 1 BROOK. PAPERS
ECON. ACTIVITY 1 (1982).
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a quantity of gold is stable, but if the price of gold fluctuates relative to other things,
the value of money in terms of other things fluctuates as well.
A further possible disadvantage of the gold standard is that it prevents
governments from using monetary policy for countercyclical purposes—a common
policy in practice, albeit one that is controversial among some economists. A
standard policy prescription during a recession is for the central bank to lower
interest rates to stimulate borrowing and investment.77 To lower interest rates,
central banks may loan money to banks more cheaply, or use money to buy up
government bonds, raising their prices and reducing effective yields in the economy.
Both sorts of policies increase the money supply, and can only be undertaken with a
gold-backed money (without jeopardizing gold reserves) if the government
concurrently acquires more gold, which may not be possible. Because many
countries were on the gold standard at the start of the Great Depression, they could
not lower interest rates without jeopardizing their gold reserves, and many
economists who believe in the efficacy of countercyclical monetary policy thus
blame the gold standard for contributing to the severity of the economic downturn.
Not only did the gold standard interfere with expansionary monetary policies
during economic downturns, but it led to some unfortunate externalities resulting
from the strategic interaction among central banks. Imagine that the world consists
of two countries, both on the gold standard.78 Each country has a central bank that
wishes to preserve some flexibility to lower interest rates in the event of an
economic downturn. But each knows that increased demand for its gold reserves
will result for the reasons noted above. Thus, to build up its stock of reserves in
anticipation of possible economic downturns, each central bank may wish to
increase interest rates to make investment in their country more attractive. Such a
policy attracts foreign investment, and foreigners will thus be led to trade gold for
domestic currency to engage in investment. But if both central banks follow this
policy, they may end up with higher interest rates, which may tend to reduce
economic growth, while accomplishing little to attract foreign investment and thus
doing little to increase their gold reserves. To avoid this unfortunate outcome, the
central banks must cooperate, and the cooperation must go beyond simply sticking
to the gold standard; they must also cooperate by agreeing not to compete
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excessively for gold. This may be quite difficult to do, and such cooperation was
apparently not very successful in practice.79
Two key lessons emerge from the history of the gold standard. First, with the
benefit of hindsight it is not clear that it served state’s interests to maintain fixed
exchange rates through the gold standard. The benefits of fixed exchange rates (such
as exchange rate stability) may not have exceeded the costs—the reduced flexibility
for addressing economic crises, and so forth. The gold standard had the virtue of
being simple and clear, but in the end may have proven oversimple and
inadequately tailored to changing conditions. A more sophisticated form of
cooperation, allowing flexibility to deviate from the gold standard when justified but
not otherwise, might have been possible in principle but did not emerge in practice.
Second, the gold standard was not self-enforcing. At first sight, it seems like a
simple coordination game: every country benefits by adhering to the same standard,
and no country does better by leaving that standard once other countries have
joined it. But that view is too sanguine. When countries experience economic
shocks, it is not necessarily in their interest to stay on the gold standard. Likewise,
although nominally adhering to a gold standard, countries can still engage in
unilateral devaluation and did so at times. Countries harmed by a decision to
abandon the standard or to devalue had no retaliatory response that was sufficient
to discourage such conduct. At most, they could devalue or abandon the gold
standard themselves, which would sacrifice whatever benefits it might have yielded
(such as domestic monetary discipline), and would not do much to “punish” the
country that initially deviated. The theoretically optimal form of retaliation against a
single deviator whose action harms multiple countries is a joint response, but a joint
response is itself subject to a collective action problem, which countries were unable
to overcome.
2. Bretton Woods
During World War II, the allied powers met in Bretton Woods, New
Hampshire to discuss the post-War economic order. Two new institutions were
conceived – the World Bank and the IMF – with the latter tasked to administer a
new system of fixed exchange rates. Under this system, the United States—by far the
largest economy in the world—agreed to exchange dollars for gold at the rate of $35
per ounce. Other countries purchased dollars in order to establish their foreign
currency reserves, and agreed to peg their currency to the dollar. Thus, if the market
According to Flandreau, id at 760, central banks were quite unsuccessful at this type of
cooperation.
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price of their currency rose above the exchange rate, a foreign country’s central
bank would sell their currency in return for dollars, which would force the value of
their currency back down to the official exchange rate. If the market price of their
currency fell below the exchange rate, the central bank would do the opposite.80
The IMF was to play a supervisory role, and to serve as a lender to countries
that ran short of foreign exchange reserves. Countries initially set their exchange
rate after negotiations with the IMF; their exchange rate would reflect what the
country and IMF agreed (or hoped) was the long-term market rate, which of course
could differ from the actual rate at any given time. Once the exchange rate had been
set, the central bank of each country (other than the United States) was obliged to
use dollars to buy its currency and to sell its currency for dollars in order to
maintain the exchange rate. The U.S. government was obliged to maintain the dollar
exchange rate with gold, which meant that it had to agree to redeem dollars for gold
at $35 an ounce.81
Countries that could not maintain the value of their currencies were
permitted to devalue their currencies with the permission of the IMF. The idea was
to permit “orderly” variations in exchange rates consistent with their long-term
value and to avoid short-term fluctuations. Thus, IMF supervision in principle would
prevent countries from manipulating their exchange rates (for example, to promote
exports or otherwise to cheat on trade agreements), while allowing them to adjust
their exchange rates to keep them in line with the fundamentals, such as relative
productivity. The IMF possessed a single carrot (or stick, depending on one’s
perspective). It could lend money to countries that agreed to abide by its rules if
they experienced balance of payments difficulties due to an outflow of foreign
exchange reserves. Often, the IMF would condition such loans on changes in
government policies to abate the balance of payments problem, such as tighter
monetary and fiscal policies to support the value of the domestic currency (so-called
“IMF conditionality”).82
The Bretton Woods system collapsed in 1971. The main reason for its failure
lay with the central role of the United States. Unlike other countries, the United
States could not devalue the dollar; it was required to trade dollars for a fixed
quantity of gold. But as other countries recovered from World War II, their
productivity increased at a faster rate than the productivity of the U.S. economy, and
For a discussion of the Bretton Woods system, see Dam, supra note _.
Mishkin, supra note _, at 536.
82 For a debate on the virtues of “IMF conditionality” see Krugman, Obstfeld & Melitz, supra note _, at
650.
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thus, as required by the long-term model of the exchange rate, the U.S. dollar should
have depreciated. Meanwhile, the United States had pursued inflationary monetary
policy, which further reduced the value of the dollar. As a result, the market value of
gold rose dramatically above $35 per ounce. An effort was made to maintain a twotier gold market, in which the price of gold for private use rose much above $35 per
ounce, and only central banks could redeem U.S. dollars for gold. 83 But that too
proved unsustainable as the amount of U.S. currency in foreign hands eventually
exceeded U.S. gold reserves, creating a “confidence problem.” Central banks
elsewhere became wary of holding more dollars, as they would have to do to
prevent their currencies from appreciating. It became clear that the demand on U.S.
gold reserves would exceed U.S. ability to meet it, and in 1971 President Nixon
“closed the gold window” and ended the ability of foreign central banks to redeem
dollars for gold.84
Part of the problem also lay in the fact that as the United States pursued
inflationary policies, other nations were forced to intervene by selling their
currencies to maintain their pegs to the dollar. This policy expanded their own
money supplies and produced undesirable inflation in their own economies.85
Accordingly, the system quickly unraveled. Foreign central banks no longer
had any incentive to maintain their pegs to the dollar, and most major economic
powers gravitated toward allowing their exchange rates to float in the market, albeit
with periodic intervention to counter swings in exchange rates that they deemed
undesirable – a system of “managed float.” Currently, most of the major currencies
float in this fashion, although a few major economic powers (notably China) have
tried to maintain a dollar peg.
The lessons of the Bretton Woods system are similar to those of the gold
standard years. Indeed, Bretton Woods was at bottom a modified gold standard. To
the degree that it worked, the system created price stability and reduced exchange
rate fluctuations, particularly in the short term, but this benefit came at the cost of
constraining the monetary policies of central banks in ways that became
objectionable, and pressures to devalue arose just as in the days of the gold
standard. Likewise, divergence in factors such as rates of growth in productivity
across countries caused the fixed exchange rates established under IMF auspices to
diverge from long-term market equilibrium values. In principle, the system was
supposed to allow nations flexibility to adjust exchange rates under IMF
See Lindert, supra note _, at 411.
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supervision, but in practice devaluations were politically controversial and
destabilizing. If the IMF was to prevent countries from “manipulating” their
currencies while permitting them to “adjust” them in response to structural
changes, clear rules were needed for distinguishing one from the other. But it is
questionable whether IMF had the capacity to distinguish these types of behavior.
Likewise, the system was simply not self-enforcing. Countries with more
efficient economies and more restrictive monetary policies could sell their
currencies to maintain their pegs, accumulating gold-backed dollars without bearing
much cost to sustain the system. Countries with less efficient economies, by
contrast, or more expansionary monetary policies, faced pressures to devalue and a
potential shortage of foreign exchange reserves (or gold in the case of the United
States). Eventually, these countries found it less costly to opt out of the system
rather than bear its costs. Put simply, changing circumstances put nations in
violation of their participation constraints, and other nations had no viable way to
prevent them from defecting.
D. Monetary Union and the Euro-Zone
Monetary union takes place when sovereign states give up their national
currencies and accept a single supranational currency controlled by a supranational
central bank. The noteworthy example of a major monetary union in modern times
is the European Monetary Union established by the Maastricht Treaty. 86 The
monetary union began officially in 1999 with the creation of the euro and the
establishment of the European Central Bank. Its founding eleven members were
subsequently joined by six others. The other ten members of the European Union
either did not qualify under the rules for joining the Euro-zone or opted out of it.
A monetary union creates several potentially significant benefits for its
members.87 First, because a common currency exists, commercial actors no longer
need to exchange currencies. The cost of such exchanges is eliminated, and crossborder transactions become cheaper.
Second, monetary union eliminates exchange rate risk, simply because
everyone uses the same money. Indeed, monetary union is just a particularly rigid
type of fixed exchange rate regime, in which central banks forfeit any opportunity to
devalue.
See Economic Monetary Union, EUR. COMM’N (May 2012)
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/emu/index_en.htm.
87 For a discussion, see Krugman, Obstfeld & Melitz, supra note_, at 559-60, 566-72.
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Third, to the extent that there are gains from international monetary policy
cooperation, as discussed earlier, a monetary union facilitates that cooperation.
Because there is a single central bank that controls the money supply, that central
bank can in theory “internalize the externalities” within the union from monetary
policy and avoid the possible issues that arise when policies are chosen noncooperatively by members of the union. Note, however, that the central bank cannot
tailor policy separately to the needs of individual members, a limitation that we will
turn to shortly.
Fourth, there are possible political benefits from monetary union. Indeed, in
many accounts of European monetary integration, the political benefits played a
more important role in motivating policymakers than the economic benefits did. In
Europe, many policymakers believed that monetary integration would help
strengthen the long-term process of European integration by further binding
member states together and establishing shared institutions.88 Political integration
would strengthen the stability of Europe, helping to avoid a recurrence of the wars
of the first half of the twentieth century, and enable Europe to act in a more unified
way in international relations.
But monetary union also imposes costs on states. The chief cost is that it
disables states from pursuing independent monetary policies.89 Recall that many
economists and virtually all central banks support countercyclical monetary policy.
To use a current example, Greece is mired in a profound economic slump, while
Germany has been enjoying modest economic growth. If each country had its own
central bank, then the Greek central bank could expand the money supply, while the
German central bank could keep the lid on inflation. With monetary union, the
European central bank cannot choose the optimal monetary policy for each country
separately because there is only one money supply. Instead, the European central
bank must balance the interests of Germany and Greece, as well as those of the other
Euro-zone countries, and choose a monetary policy that is optimal for the union as a
whole.
The balance of these costs and benefits depends on the setting, and is the
topic of the theory of optimal currency unions associated with Robert Mundell.90
Mundell identifies four factors that determine whether a group of states should
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create a currency union, all of which relate to the possibility that economic
conditions within the union may be more or less variable across members.
First, a currency union is more likely to be jointly beneficial if the member
states’ economies are sufficiently similar, so that they are generally subject to the
same macroeconomic shocks and experience a common business cycle. Then, the
common monetary policy in the union can respond to events that affect the
members of the union more or less uniformly. For example, two states that depend
heavily on oil revenues will be subject to much the same shocks—an increase in
demand when other countries experience economic growth or war breaks out in the
Middle East, a decrease in demand when new sources of oil are discovered in
foreign countries. These countries might make plausible candidates for monetary
union, but it would be inadvisable to add a country that suffers significant economic
downturns when the price of oil rises.
Second (and third), monetary union is more likely to be jointly beneficial
when capital and labor are mobile between members of the union. Both of these
factors are related to the problem of unsynchronized macroeconomic shocks. If a
recession strikes one state, but unemployed workers can quickly move to the other
state, the negative effect of the shock is less than it would otherwise be. The same
point can be made about capital mobility. Another way of putting this point is that if
labor mobility and capital mobility are high, then unsynchronized shocks are less
likely to occur in the first place, or their effects will be more limited. Thus, it is less
important for the member states to be able to pursue separate countercyclical
monetary policies.
Fourth, monetary union is more likely to be jointly beneficial when the states
have a coordinated tax and fiscal policy that allows transfers to be made from one
part of the union to another. If one state suffers a downturn while the other enjoys a
boom, for example, then the second state can stimulate the economy of the first (or
otherwise ameliorate the effects of the downturn) by making transfers to the
citizens of the other state. More generally, if the states jointly tax the citizens of both
states and implement a common welfare system, then a downturn in one state will
automatically cause transfers from the booming state (whose citizens will pay
higher taxes on their rising incomes) to the depressed state (whose unemployed
citizens will receive transfers). But fiscal unification to this degree is possible only
when the populations in both states agree to it, which may be difficult because
people tend to believe that they are not responsible for the economic well-being of
citizens of foreign states, or people in wealthier states fear that a common fiscal
policy will result in transfers of their wealth to people in poorer states.
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On the basis of these considerations, many economists criticized European
monetary integration back in the 1990s,91 and that criticism has proven to be
perspicacious. The critics pointed out that European countries had very different
economies and so would be likely to suffer different macroeconomic shocks; that
labor (but not capital) mobility was low because of cultural barriers; and that the
European Union (and the subset of Euro-zone states) lacked common fiscal
institutions and hence could not easily make transfers across members. European
policymakers apparently believed that these problems were either minimal or could
be overcome through further integration, which would be stimulated in part by
monetary integration. One idea, for example, was that a common currency would
provide symbolic support for political integration, and thus help stimulate European
solidarity, which could then provide the political basis for fiscal integration. But that
has not happened.
The European experience can be compared with the “dollar-zone”
established over a century ago in the United States, where one might also have
worried that there was too much macroeconomic variation across states to justify a
common currency. One difference between the United States and Europe, however,
is that in the United States both capital and labor mobility is high because of a
combination of constitutional guarantees and a common language and culture.
Moreover, fiscal integration exists in the United States at the federal level. When a
macroeconomic shock hits one region in the United States, the existing tax-andtransfer system ensures that money flows from the other regions to the affected
region. No similar institution exists in Europe.92
The current crisis in the Euro-zone began as a sovereign debt crisis, but the
sovereign debt problem and monetary integration are closely related. The
Maastricht Treaty required member states to satisfy certain macroeconomic
standards—such as low inflation and low debt- and deficit-to-GDP ratios.93 It also
included a no-bailout clause.94 The idea was apparently both to persuade creditors
(and voters in wealthier countries) that more creditworthy countries like Germany
would not have to bail out weaker countries like Greece, and to reduce the weakness
of the weaker countries by compelling them to comply with sound macroeconomic
See Martin Feldstein, The Political Economy of the European Economic and Monetary Union: Political
Sources of an Economic Liability, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 23 (1997) .
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available
at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/09/eurozone-germanyidUSLDE7581ZN20110609. The no bailout clause is contained in Article 103 of the EC Treaty.
91

33

policies. Virtually all countries violated the macroeconomic standards from the
beginning, however, including Germany and France. Greece borrowed vastly in
excess of its capacity to repay. Creditors and bond rating agencies treated Greece as
creditworthy nevertheless, possibly because they believed that Greece was not
deviating too far from the standards and were fooled by Greece’s mendacious
financial reporting, possibly because they assumed that Germany would bail out
Greece if it defaulted, possibly because they believed that Greece’s economy would
grow rapidly enough to absorb its growing debt obligations, or some combination of
these possibilities.
When it became clear in the spring of 2010 that Greece would not be able to
repay its debts, creditors refused to lend anymore except at interest rates that
Greece could not afford. Other euro-zone members refused to bail out Greece. As
this became clear, the crisis spread to Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Italy. The reasons
for the weakness of these countries varied—in some of them, the government
borrowed too much; in others, the banks borrowed too much and governments
were on the hook for bank debt. In any event, it appeared that these countries too
might default, and that they, like Greece, would not be bailed out, with the result
that creditors demanded high interest rates for new debt. A further exacerbating
factor is that many banks in these countries owned Greek debt; if Greece defaulted,
then these banks might default, requiring bailouts from national governments,
putting further pressure on their finances. Thus, a real fear of contagion arose,
extending even to Germany and France. Later in 2010, the euro-zone countries set
up a European Financial Stability Facility with the authority to make loans to
countries subject to the contagion, including Greece.95 Subsequent efforts in this
vein have staved off financial collapse for the time being, although at this writing the
situation is very much in flux.
The European sovereign debt crisis could have happened without monetary
integration, but integration exacerbated it in three ways. First, as noted, creditors
treated the peripheral countries as more creditworthy than they really were,
possibly because they believed that other euro-zone countries would bail them out
if they defaulted. This resulted in excessive borrowing by those countries. Second,
governments of the core states apparently encouraged their national central banks
to purchase the debt of peripheral states, creating an artificial subsidy for that debt.
Third, precisely because the peripheral countries could not use monetary policy to
stimulate their economies and avoid defaulting on their debt, the common currency
put them in a more difficult economic position than they would otherwise faced.
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What will happen going forward? If optimum currency theory is taken
seriously, then breakup of the Euro-zone seems to be the most likely outcome, with
countries either returning to their original currencies or the creation of smaller
currency unions (such as a “neuro” for northern countries).96 Breakup would be
logistically difficult, however, as well as expensive, and—in the view of European
leaders—politically disastrous. Thus, the question is whether Europeans will be
willing to incur the cost of an inefficient currency union in order to maintain its
political benefits. That question is difficult to answer.
Another possibility is institutional reform, so that the costs associated with a
suboptimal currency union can be minimized. Two major reforms have been
discussed. The first is a strengthening of macroeconomic constraints on member
countries, so that the Greek experience will never be repeated. The problem with
this approach is that the constraints must be enforced, and the usual sanction—
expulsion from the monetary union—is not credible because of the overriding
desire to maintain the union. Indeed, the problem with the Maastricht Treaty was
not that the macroeconomic criteria were too weak; the problem was that they were
not enforced.97 Once again, the difficulty in fashioning a viable self-enforcement
mechanism lies at the heart of the problem.
The second reform is further political integration. If European states could
agree to fiscal union, so European citizens pay taxes to a European institution, which
in turn makes transfers back to them, then fiscal policy could be used to offset some
of the negative effects of monetary union when shocks are not common but hit
particular states. The problem with this proposal is massive political resistance to
fiscal union among voters in wealthy countries, who fear that the institution will
simply transfer wealth from them to people in poor countries.98
The European experience provides an important lesson about the limits of
international law. Macroeconomic policy creates externalities, and in theory
countries can advance their self-interest by engaging in international cooperation.
But uncertainty about optimal policy and the difficulty of implementing selfSee Jerry Bowyer, Euro, Neuro and Nero: Plausible Outcomes for a Continental Crack-Up, FORBES,
November 30, 2011, http://www.forbes.com/sites/jerrybowyer/2011/11/30/euro-neuro-andnero-plausible-outcomes-for-a-continental-crack-up/.
97 Or at least the problem was not just that the Maastricht criteria were too weak. One problem is that
they constrained only public debt, not private debt, when private debt could become a public
responsibility, as occurred in Ireland and other countries. See Goodhart, supra note _, at 7.
98 As of this writing, Europeans have agreed in principle on a partial integration, focusing on debtsharing and banking regulation, but the details, which may prove to be stumbling blocks, have not
been worked out. See e.g., Ralitsa Kovacheva, Is it time for common European Taxes?, EUINSIDE,
(August 2010), http://www.euinside.eu/en/news/is-it-time-for-common-european-taxes.
96

35

enforcement mechanisms in a volatile environment have undermined most efforts
to cooperate. Until the European experiment, countries approached international
monetary cooperation in a cautious spirit, in general adopting ad hoc arrangements
that could quickly be abandoned. The European Monetary Union went to the
opposite extreme by establishing a rigid treaty-based system that could not handle
large adverse macroeconomic shocks and their political consequences. Once again,
successful international cooperation on macroeconomic affairs has proven elusive.
E. Floating Exchange Rates and “Currency Manipulation” (the China problem)
As noted, after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, most major
economies let their currencies float, while other economies pegged their currencies
to (usually) their major trading partner. The system is governed by Article IV,
section 1, of the IMF agreement:
Recognizing that the essential purpose of the international monetary system
is to provide a framework that facilitates the exchange of goods, services, and
capital among countries, and that sustains sound economic growth, and that
a principal objective is the continuing development of the orderly underlying
conditions that are necessary for financial and economic stability, each
member undertakes to collaborate with the Fund and other members to
assure orderly exchange arrangements and to promote a stable system of
exchange rates. In particular, each member shall:
(i) endeavor to direct its economic and financial policies toward the objective
of fostering orderly economic growth with reasonable price stability, with
due regard to its circumstances;
(ii) seek to promote stability by fostering orderly underlying economic and
financial conditions and a monetary system that does not tend to produce
erratic disruptions;
(iii) avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system
in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an
unfair competitive advantage over other members; and
(iv) follow exchange policies compatible with the undertakings under this
Section. 99
In practice, the IMF provides advice to countries about exchange rate policies
(known as “surveillance”), encouraging them to obey these principles. But it has
never adjudicated a country to be in violation of this article.
Still, it is worthwhile to ask what function the IMF might serve in addressing
externalities from exchange rate policies in the post-Bretton Woods environment.
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Two goals are identified: (1) maintaining “stability,” and (2) preventing
“manipulation.” What do these mean, and are they viable goals?
1. Stability
Exchange rate stability is, as we have seen, a value. A country that maintains
exchange rate stability confers a benefit both on its citizens and on foreigners by
reducing exchange rate risk. But exchange rate stability is only one value among
many. Indeed, economists have observed that policymakers face a tradeoff between
exchange rate stability, monetary policy autonomy, and freedom of financial flows,
and can satisfy only two of these values at the same time. If a country opts for
exchange rate stability and freedom of financial flows, then (unless it is a very large
country) its monetary policy will be determined in part by the choices of foreign
states. If a country chooses monetary policy autonomy and freedom of financial
flows, then it must permit its exchange rate to float.100
The problem for the IMF is that monetary policy autonomy and freedom of
financial flows are just as important for the economic well-being of a country as
exchange rate stability is. Indeed, they may be more important. If states want to
attract foreign investment, then they must allow capital to move across their
borders. If states want to use monetary policy to counter economic downturns, then
they need control over monetary policy. The optimal mix of these instruments
surely varies from state to state.
Accordingly, any simple rule requiring states to maintain a “stable” exchange
rate is likely to be unacceptable because in many cases it would require states to
forego policies that they deem important—that was a core problem with fixed
exchange rates as we have seen. Despite the goal of “stability,” states in fact desire to
retain considerable flexibility. But how is such flexibility to be governed so as to
avoid substantial externalities? A rule that required states to choose the “optimal”
mix of policy instruments would clearly be unworkable; it would require so many
state contingent elements that it would be impossible to craft. No one really knows
what the optimal mix of policy instruments is, and those who think they know will
find large numbers of people who disagree. For this reason, the IMF goal of
“stability” is difficult to implement as a legal matter, just as the effort to maintain
fixed exchange rates during the Bretton Woods years ultimately proved a failure.
IMF staff can jawbone national governments about stability as part of the
surveillance process, and will no doubt continue to do so, but because clear rules
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about what is required cannot be devised, national authorities will retain the
discretion to promote the degree of “stability” that they believe serves the national
interest even if the global interest is not always well served.
2. Manipulation101
The goal of avoiding “manipulation” is focused on trade policy. Under IMF
Article IV, members are obliged not to intervene in exchange markets for the
purpose of securing an “unfair competitive advantage” in international trade. The
fear is that a nation may artificially depress its exchange rate in order to make its
exports cheaper and imports more expensive.
In recent years, accusations of manipulation have focused particularly on
China. For many years, China has maintained a rough peg between its currency
(RMB) and the dollar. To prevent the RMB from appreciating, it has intervened by
selling RMB and buying dollars, to the point that it has now accumulated over $2
trillion in foreign exchange reserves. Over the same period China has often run trade
surpluses with major trading partners, particularly the United States and Europe.102
From an economic standpoint, the rule against “manipulation” may be
questioned, as its effects on other nations are at best unclear. In the long run,
exchange rate devaluations will have no “real” effect on economic activity because
other prices will adjust to offset—a consequence of what economists terms the longrun neutrality of money. By analogy, if the United States government were to fiat
that every dollar suddenly becomes two dollars, the eventual equilibrium would
involve all prices in dollars doubling, so that in real terms nothing had changed. In
the short run, things are more complicated but still subtle. For example, if goods are
priced in the currency of the country in which they are manufactured, and an
unanticipated reduction in the value of that currency occurs, then exports become
cheaper in foreign currency and imports become more expensive in domestic
currency. This phenomenon raises the national income of trading partners (in
economic parlance, their “terms of trade” improve because what they sell becomes
more expensive and what they buy becomes cheaper), while reducing the exporting
country’s national income (for the opposite reason). It is not obvious why trading
partners should complain about policies that increase their national incomes.103
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Nevertheless, such short run effects may beget adverse political reactions
abroad from exporting firms and import-competing firms. Such political
considerations perhaps explain the genesis of IMF Article IV. Likewise, Article XV of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade provides that members shall not “by
exchange action frustrate the intent of the provisions of this Agreement.”104 These
provisions plainly evidence a concern that currency practices may undermine
certain rules of the international trading system, including limits on tariffs and
export subsidies.
Despite the extensive intervention by many countries into exchange markets
through the years, however, no country has been adjudicated to be in violation of
either the IMF prohibition on manipulation or the GATT prohibition on measures
that frustrate its intent. It also seems unlikely that any country will be found to have
violated these rules in the future. It is instructive to ask why. The answer, as one of
us has argued in another paper coauthored with Robert Staiger,105 is that clear rules
to distinguish manipulation from other, acceptable forms of exchange market
intervention are simply too difficult to fashion.106
Under IMF law, before a member may be found to have engaged in illegal
currency manipulation to affect the balance of trade, it must have deliberately
affected the exchange rate to a degree sufficient to cause “fundamental
misalignment,” and must have done so for the “purpose” of increasing net exports.
Regarding the purpose of its policies, members’ representations are given “the
benefit of any reasonable doubt.”107
Putting aside the “misalignment” concept which need not detain us here, it is
exceedingly difficult to divine the “purpose” behind government policies. To take the
example of China, Chinese officials deny that they are manipulating the exchange
rate to increase net exports. Alternative accounts of their motivations, entitled to the
“benefit of any reasonable doubt” as noted above, are supported by the work of
some prominent academics. Ronald McKinnon, a well-known monetary economist,
for example, has argued that China’s policies have controlled inflation within the
Chinese economy effectively and stimulated economic growth.108 This argument
may well satisfy the “reasonable doubt” standard that the IMF itself embraces.109
GATT Art. XV.
Staiger & Sykes, supra note __.
106 For a related discussion on the difficulty of regulation, see Claus D. Zimmerman, Exchange Rate
Misalignment and International Law, 105 AMER. J. INT’L L. 423 (2011).
107 See id.
108 See Ronald McKinnon, China’s Exchange Rate and Fiscal Expansion, Stanford Institute for Economic
Policy Research (unpub., March 2009),
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The core problem here again lies in the impossibility of crafting a legal rule
that turns on verifiable information. Nations engage in monetary policies, including
exchange market intervention, for a host of reasons, many considered benign and a
proper exercise of national sovereignty. To protect the ability of IMF members to
pursue such policies, the IMF seeks to sort cases based on the intent of the monetary
authorities. But intent is not ascertainable as a legal matter, and the rules
accordingly have no real force.
If the IMF offers little hope in this area, what about the WTO? GATT Article
XV(4) states that members “shall not, by exchange action, frustrate the intent of the
provisions of this Agreement.”110 Nothing in Article XV or elsewhere in GATT
provides guidance, however, as to what sorts of exchange practices would be
acceptable. Likewise, Article XV(4) has never been interpreted by the WTO/GATT
dispute system, and no case law exists on the question of what exchange practices
would violate the GATT.
A policy that runs throughout Article XV, however, is deference to IMF rules.
For example, Article XV(9) states that “[n]othing in this Agreement shall preclude ...
the use by a contracting party of exchange controls or exchange restrictions in
accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund.” A
threshold question, therefore, is whether an “exchange action” can frustrate the
intent of GATT if it is not a violation of IMF law. This question is critical in light the
fact that the IMF would have great difficulty adjudicating China's policies to be
"currency manipulation" for reasons given above, and because the WTO would
almost certainly defer to the IMF on this issue if it is deemed legally relevant.
But perhaps a violation of GATT Article XV(4)does not, as a legal matter,
require a violation of IMF law. Can the WTO plausibly adjudicate a violation of
Article XV(4) without IMF support? Nations undertake macroeconomic policies all
the time that have the potential to influence trade (including, historically, some
dramatic currency devaluations). Current U.S. monetary policy, for example, has
lowered interest rates and placed downward pressure on the dollar to a degree that
may well have had significant trade impact. Such general macroeconomic policies
have never even been challenged, let alone condemned, in the WTO/GATT system. If
the WTO dispute process were now to rule that certain macroeconomic policies
affecting trade are illegal, it would open a Pandora's box with enormous potential
for political strife and tension within the system. It thus seems unlikely that the
http://www.stanford.edu/~mckinnon/briefs/policybrief_mar09.pdf
109 Staiger & Sykes, supra note __, at 591-92.
110 GATT Art. XV(4).
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WTO would find a violation of Article XV(4) in an exchange practice that was
permissible under the applicable law of the IMF.
Thus, the WTO suffers the same essential problem as the IMF when it
confronts allegations that exchange measures “frustrate the intent” of GATT. It is
exceedingly difficult to distinguish legitimate monetary policies from inappropriate
ones. The vagueness of the standard under GATT Article XV(4), and the fact that it
has never been the subject of adjudication in the now 65 year history of the GATT
system, reflects the difficult and perhaps insurmountable challenges of devising any
sort of clear principle for identifying problematic practices.
V. A Regime Not (or Barely) Tried: Macroeconomic Stimulus Cooperation
Countries that pursue monetary policy that maximizes their national interest
will, under plausible assumptions, choose monetary actions that harm (or benefit)
other countries.111 Cooperation may mitigate this problem, but, as we will see,
international cooperation with respect to monetary policy is extremely difficult.
Although economists disagree a great deal about optimal monetary policy,
there is not much doubt that monetary policy can produce inflation or deflation.
When a central bank prints money, more money chases a constant supply of goods
and services, and so the value of money relative to those goods and services
declines. Conversely, deflation takes place if the central bank withdraws enough
money from the economy.112
If economists generally agree that central banks can influence the money
supply and hence the price level, they agree much less on whether central banks can
do so in a manner that effectively advances social goals. The most common position,
and one that is reflected in the policies of most central banks, is that central banks
can smooth out the business cycle by pursuing countercyclical monetary policy.
Simplifying greatly, the theory is as follows. During economic recessions, people are
afraid to spend money, because they do not know whether they will be employed for
long; and businesses are reluctant to invest money, because they do not think that
people will buy their goods. As a result businesses fire employees, who then are
unable to buy goods, which further reduces demand, in a downward spiral. The
central bank can help end a recession by increasing the money supply. The reason is
See Giancorlo Corsetti & Gernot J. Műller, Rethinking Multilateral Policy Cooperation in the XXI
Century: What Do We Know About Cross-Border Effects of Fiscal Policy? (unpub., 2011) (describing
theory and evidence on cross-border effects of fiscal policy).
112 See Krugman, Obstfeld & Melitz, supra note _, at 369.
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that as money becomes more plentiful, the cost of borrowing money will decline,113
so businesses will be more willing to borrow money in order invest. That means
that they will hire workers, who will then have enough money to buy things; the
workers will also be more willing to borrow in order to buy things, which will also
results in businesses having more money to invest. In short, by reducing the cost of
credit or money, the central bank increases aggregate demand, which creates more
economic activity.
Once good times return, however, the central bank must put on the brakes,
and reduce (or stop increasing) the money supply. Once the economy reaches full
capacity, easy credit will not result in the hiring of additional workers or the buying
of additional goods and services. Instead, the ratio of money to the value of goods
and services increases, producing inflation. Inflation generally interferes with
economic activity by making prices unpredictable, thereby creating risk, and by
harming actors who are not effectively hedged against it.114 A central bank reduces
the money supply to limit inflation.
The efficacy of such countercyclical policies has been somewhat
controversial through the years. Early “rational expectations” critiques suggested
that economic actors would anticipate the inflationary effects of any increase in the
money supply, so that wages and prices would increase and monetary stimulus
would have no real effects (again, the long run neutrality of money scenario).115
Other economists responded that price flexibility is limited, in some cases due to
contracts that lock in existing prices, so that monetary policy can have real effects in
the short term.116 That view currently predominates, and the current tendency
among most important central banks, as far as we know, is to pursue countercyclical
monetary policy. Nonetheless, what is good for a particular country is not
necessarily good for all countries, as we will now show.
To illustrate, assume that a central bank can affect price levels by controlling
the money supply. Imagine that two countries face an economic downturn, and
believe that it is in their interest to expand the money supply—that is, they conclude
that the benefit in the form of increased employment exceeds the cost of possible
future inflation. The two countries are Home and Foreign, and each can choose two
Id. at 362.
See Blanchard & Fischer, supra note _, at 568-69.
115 Id. at 573-75.
116 E.g., John B. Taylor, Aggregate Dynamics and Staggered Contracts, 88 J. POL. ECON, 1 (1980); Stanley
Fischer, Long-Term Contracts, Rational Expectations and the Optimal Money Supply Rule, 85 J. POL.
ECON. 191 (1977).
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monetary policies—“somewhat expansionary” and “very expansionary.”117 An
expansionary monetary policy reduces Home’s unemployment rate, while creating a
risk of inflation. The policy might also influence economic outcomes in Foreign—but
the effect could be complex. One potential effect is that stimulus in Home will
increase demand in Home for Foreign’s products, thus benefiting Foreign’s
economy. Another potential effect is that stimulus in Home will, by causing inflation
in Home, cause Foreign’s currency to increase in value relative to Home’s currency.
This could hurt Foreign’s export sector and—indirectly, by causing unemployment
in that sector and thus potentially a decline of aggregate demand—the entire
economy. It could also cause asset bubbles in Foreign. As interest rates fall in Home,
investors will shift their investments to Foreign, bidding up asset prices in a manner
that may not be sustainable over time.
Let us thus assume that when Home chooses a somewhat expansionary
policy, it benefits Foreign, and when it chooses a very expansionary policy, it harms
Foreign. The same is true in the opposite direction. Thus, the optimal outcome for
both countries is reached when both countries choose the somewhat expansionary
monetary policy. It may be in Home’s interest, however, to switch from a somewhat
to very expansionary monetary policy because, for Home, the gains (in terms of
further reduction in unemployment) exceed the losses (inflation), while Home has
no incentive to take into account the costs for Foreign. Foreign has the same
incentives, and thus in the absence of cooperation, both Home and Foreign may
choose the suboptimal very expansionary monetary policy.
Can Home and Foreign cooperate in order to avoid the jointly inferior
outcome? There are two major problems. The first is the fundamental policy
uncertainty—both at the level of theory and in terms of practical application.
Economists cannot agree on monetary policy, and even if they could, there is even
less agreement in particular contexts as to how the central bank should affect the
money supply. Thus, countries may refuse to cooperate simply because they
disagree about what should be done.
A second problem is the familiar difficulty of creating a self-enforcing
agreement. Even if states can agree that (in our example) “somewhat expansionary
monetary policy” is jointly optimal, while “very expansionary monetary policy” is
not jointly optimal, they may not be able to reach a self-enforcing agreement that
limits them to optimal actions. The reason is that retaliation may involve actions
Cf. the model Krugman, Obstfeld & Melitz, supra note _, at 554-56, which considers the opposite
policy scenario—that countries choose among restrictive monetary policies to combat inflation.
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that are costly to the retaliator and not credible. In our example, suppose that
Foreign is surprised by Home’s very expansionary monetary policy, and that its only
retaliatory option is to engage in the same policy next period. By that time, however,
economic circumstances may have changed and an expansionary policy may no
longer be in its self-interest.
Going beyond our example, the two-country assumption masks an enormous
amount of real-world complexity. Monetary policies no doubt have important
externalities, but they run in many directions among the important economies of the
world – Europe, the United States, Japan, China, and so on. The task of orchestrating
useful cooperation in this setting – where central banks face a divergence of
circumstances and a divergence of views on optimal policies, is truly daunting.
As a consequence, about the most one can expect is occasional ad hoc
cooperation among a subset of central banks confronting an immediate short-term
problem.118 Central banks famously were unable to cooperate in response to the
Great Depression, when at least in theory they might have agreed to pump liquidity
into the international financial system, but distrust in a hostile international
environment and disagreement about policy undermined negotiations.119 In
subsequent years, efforts at cooperation centered around management of exchange
rates rather than coordinated responses to global downturns. Possibly the most
successful examples of cooperation among national financial authorities were the
responses to sovereign debt crises in Mexico in 1994-1995, and Asia in 1997-1998,
where western countries launched rescues through the IMF.120 After the September
11, 2001 attack, the Fed opened foreign exchange swap lines with a number of
foreign central banks, which enabled those banks to borrow U.S. currency from the
Fed, and then relend this money to banks located in their jurisdiction that provided
loans in U.S. currency.121 But this approach, which may have prevented a global
downturn through injection of liquidity internationally, was essentially a unilateral
move. Foreign central banks accepted the loans so that they could support local
banks that took deposits in U.S. dollars, not as a part of a coordinated response to
international macroeconomic conditions. Over the next several years, under the
auspices of the G20 and the IMF, countries attempted to address global economic
“imbalances” (chiefly, the worry that U.S. current account deficit would eventually
Discussed in Eichengreen, supra note _; Flandreau, supra note _. For a relatively optimistic account
that argues that cooperation has increased, albeit fitfully, see Richard N. Cooper, Almost a Century of
Central Bank Cooperation, BIS Working Papers No. 198 (Feb. 2006).
119 Eichengreen, supra note _, at 12.
120 Id. at 23.
121 Douglas W. Arner, Paul Lejof, and Michael A. Panton, Central Banks and Central Bank Cooperation
in the Global Financial Crisis, 23 Pac. McGeorge GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L. J. 1 (2010).
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result in a sharp devaluation of the dollar, causing a global recession) but made little
progress.122
The financial crisis that began in 2007 posed a considerable challenge to
central bank cooperation.123 The central bank response began as early as November
of that year, when G-20 ministers announced that that central bank governors
recognized the global downturn and would cooperate in addressing it; subsequently
the central banks of the top developing countries announced that they would jointly
pump liquidity into their national economies.124 The Fed opened foreign exchange
swap lines with foreign central banks, so as to ensure that U.S. currency would be
available for foreign loans. The European and Swiss central banks, and other central
banks, did so as well for their own currencies.125 Subsequently, the central banks
coordinated in cutting interest rates.126 However, countries failed to coordinate
their fiscal policies; some commentators argue that the Fed loosened monetary
policy without taking into account the negative effects on other countries; and
“there is no disputing that the inability at the Seoul G20 summit in November 2010
to agree on what constituted mutually-beneficial adjustments in monetary and fiscal
policies left potential gains from policy coordination on the table.”127
The success of the swap operations was probably due to the very narrow
form of cooperation they entailed: a loan from one central bank to another, where
the Fed gains from the injection of liquidity, and the recipient gains through the
support for its local banks. There is no short-term cost from this type of
cooperation, and virtually no credit risk.128 The broader and more controversial
forms of cooperation involving coordinated monetary and fiscal policies had much
more limited success.
VI. Explanations
We have discussed four areas of international economic cooperation: (1)
trade; (2) banking regulation; (3) exchange rate regulation; and (4) monetary
stimulus cooperation. We have measured cooperation in two ways: the extent to
which cooperation has been institutionalized in international rules, international
Eichengreen, supra note _, at 28.
For a useful account, see Brummer, supra note _, ch. 5.
124 Id. at 34.
125 William A. Allen & Richhild Moessner, Central Bank Cooperation and International Liquidity in the
Financial Crisis of 2008-2009, BIS Working Papers No. 310 (May 2010), at 26.
126 Id. at 36.
127 Eichengreen, supra note _, at 29.
128 See Arner et al., supra note _, at 35.
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agencies, and domestic law; and the extent to which cooperation has had positive
economic outcomes. Trade cooperation can be counted a success: it has been heavily
institutionalized and it seems to have contributed to the growth of international
trade. Banking regulation can be counted a partial success. Banking regulation is not
heavily institutionalized at the international level, but the Basel rules have been
incorporated into domestic law and probably have contributed to international
financial stability in good times but could not prevent financial disaster. Exchange
rate regulation has largely failed: it was institutionalized during the Bretton Woods
era but subject to a great deal of ad hoc adjustment, and had limited impact on
international exchange rates, which were later allowed to float. Finally, central
banks have largely failed to coordinate efforts to stimulate economies during
downturns, and national governments have not even attempted fiscal cooperation,
with very limited exceptions.
What accounts for this pattern? With such a small number of data points, one
can only speculate, but we will hazard the following explanation. First, cooperation
becomes possible as the expected gain from cooperation increases. This point may
seem too obvious to be worth making, but international macroeconomic
cooperation illustrates a twist, emphasizing the word “expected.” The expected gain
from cooperation is a function partly of policy uncertainty. When optimal policy is
uncertain, the gains must be discounted; in addition, there is option value in playing
wait-and-see, or taking modest rather than aggressive measures. The benefits, costs,
and risks of international trade have been largely understood by economists since
the early nineteenth century. Thus, the gains from international trade cooperation
could be easily predicted. By contrast, economists disagree a great deal more about
exchange rate policy, banking regulation, and stimulus; the empirical effects of these
actions are harder to predict.
Second, cooperation becomes possible at an international level when the
behavior of interest is susceptible to rule-based regulation. Because cooperation is
possible only when countries can monitor each other and retaliate in response to
violations, and monitoring is very difficult at the international level, it is necessary
for violations to be clearly defined, which is possible only if clear rules distinguish
permissible and forbidden behavior. It turns out that some forms of cooperative
behavior can be more easily governed by rules than other forms can.
Consider first international trade. For certain types of behavior, violations
can be easily defined and punished. If states agree that the tariff on certain goods
will be no greater than X, then violation occurs when the tariff is higher than X.
Because the exporter must pay the tariff, its existence cannot be disputed. There are
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harder cases, to be sure. Whether a pollution control law is an impermissible trade
barrier or a legitimate method for reducing pollution can turn on complex
evidentiary questions, but the analytic inquiry is relatively straightforward. And
even if this area of trade law can be subject to abuse, the reduction of tariff barriers
is a clear example of success. International law in this way enables states to obtain
some cooperative benefits even if a portion of the theoretically possible cooperative
surplus lies beyond their reach.
Banking regulation provides an instructive comparison. The Basel I system
created a system of crude rules that could be mechanically applied. It established a
minimum ratio of capital to assets. It required banks to calculate their assets by
placing them into one of four risk-weighted baskets and multiplying their value by 0,
0.2, 0.5, or 1, depending on the level of risk. Off-balance sheet items were subject to
a similar risk conversion process. Capital was carefully defined, and then mechanical
rules were used to determine the extent to which different types of capital (common
equity, different types of preferred such as cumulative and noncumulative,
subordinated debt, and so forth) could be used for the numerator of the capital
adequacy ratio. Thus, banking agencies in different countries using this method
would likely obtain very similar results.
But the algorithm was too crude. A loan to a highly creditworthy municipality
and a loan to a less creditworthy municipality received the same weight because all
loans to municipalities were put in the same basket. A bank with good management
was treated the same as a bank with bad management. A bank that reduced its risk
exposure by buying derivatives would receive no credit.129 The Basel Committee
responded with the significantly more complex Basel II rules. Basel II permits banks
to use their own models to calculate the risk of default; regulators may approve or
reject those models but it is not clear that other countries can evaluate the
regulators’ decisions. Basel II also requires regulators to evaluate banks’ market risk
and operational risk in addition to credit risk—and not only that but also systemic
risk, reputational risk, pension risk, strategic risk, and many other types of risk.
Under Basel I, the analysis of a bank could produce a single number—the leverage
ratio—that could be compared to a simple rule—the leverage limit. Under Basel II,
the analysis of a bank produces all kinds of numbers reflecting different types of
risks, and no clear way to aggregate them. The additional complexity unavoidably
requires regulators to rely more on judgment, which makes cross-country

U.S. Government Accounting Office, Risk-Based Capital: Bank Regulators Need to Improve
Transparency and Overcome Impediments to Finalizing the Proposed Basel II Framework, 3, GAO,
(2007), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-253[] .
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monitoring more difficult. Basel III, created in response to the failure of Basel II to
prevent the financial crisis, is even more complex.
In this case, reliance on simple rules turns out to be impossible: they result in
banks being either excessively risky or excessively constrained. But under the more
complex system, it may be too difficult for countries to determine whether the
regulators of other countries are complying or not. However, it is too soon to tell
whether Basel III will succeed or fail.
Exchange rate risk provides another setting. One might believe that
management of exchange rate would be similar to management of trade. In both
cases, countries must make a tradeoff and embody it in a system of rules. In the case
of trade, countries trade off the interests of exporters and import-competing firms
(and possibly consumers) and agree to tariffs and trade barriers that are mutually
beneficial. Once these rules are in place, states monitor each other for compliance.
Then why has exchange rate cooperation been so difficult? A key reason is
that exchange rates are in fact rather difficult to govern through rule-based
regulation. Any agreement on specific exchange rates quickly becomes outdated as
macroeconomic shocks lead some nations to run short on reserves and wish to
devalue. A system is necessary that permits states to change exchange rates to
respond to these shocks while prohibiting them from doing so for “manipulative”
reasons—for example, to stimulate exports at the expense of other states. But no
mechanical formula for distinguishing valid and invalid exchange rate policy has
been discovered, and so distinguishing violations is very difficult.130 Likewise, under
Bretton Woods, the IMF was given supervisory authority, but little enforcement
power, no doubt because countries could not commit themselves to trusting an
agency with discretionary authority.
Finally, cooperation must be self-enforcing. Nations must have a credible
threat to retaliate against cheating that is sufficient to discourage cheating in the
first place, at least under ordinary circumstances. In international trade, selfenforcement works because the threat to withdraw prior trade concessions in
response to cheating is perfectly credible, at least for large countries. Political
officials can benefit from such retaliation and show no reluctance to use it when it is
authorized. In the other systems we have studied, however, retaliatory threats are
Compare Barry Eichengreen’s discussion of the dispute over whether quantitative easing was
currency manipulation, as alleged by foreign countries. Barry Eichengreen, Mr. Bernanke Goes to War,
NAT’LL INT., December 16, 2010, available at http://nationalinterest.org/article/mr-bernanke-goeswar-4573.
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inadequate to sustain cooperation in many scenarios. If banking regulators in
country A are unwilling to liquidate failing banks in a crisis, for example, the
prospect that foreign regulators may behave similarly can be insufficient to change
their minds – here, due to shocks, nations are better off by deviating and seeing
cooperation unravel than they are by complying. The same problem afflicts
exchange rate cooperation when a nation comes under intense pressure to devalue.
Put differently, shocks to the international trade system historically tend to
be small and sufficiently industry specific that no member can benefit by opting out
of cooperation altogether. Even when the temptation to deviate on a particular issue
arises, the value of cooperation on many other issues remains and participation in
the system is stable.
Cooperation in the trade area also benefits from the fact that retaliation can
be targeted directly at the violator. If Europe cheats on a commitment to the United
States, the United States can respond with a discriminatory tariff on important
European exports to the United States. If Japan cheats on an exchange rate
commitment by devaluing the yen, by contrast, the United States could respond with
measures to devalue the dollar, but those measures would affect many other nations
(and currencies). Only a coordinated response involving all major currencies other
than the yen can move the world toward the status quo ante, but such coordinated
responses may be much more difficult to orchestrate. Similar problems can arise
with banking regulation and other types of monetary policy coordination.
Conclusion
Our paper might seem excessively pessimistic, but that would be a
misinterpretation of it. If it had been written in 1940, it would have been regarded
as excessively optimistic. We suspect that from 1945 to the present, countries have
exploited all or nearly all the gains from international macroeconomic cooperation
that are possible under the sort of rules-based system that can be the subject of
international law. Particularly from 1990 to 2001, international conditions were
about as favorable as they have ever been for international cooperation in general,
so it is predictable that countries would have exploited whatever gains were
available. Further gains can be obtained only through the merger of states, so that
central banks and other financial regulators could exercise discretionary authority
over a larger population. That is what the Europeans tried, with mixed results,
probably because the European economies are not sufficiently integrated and
European populations lack sufficient solidarity.
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